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I. Introduction
Foreign investment, and foreign direct investment in particular,'
has in recent times been the driving force behind the growth and
restructuring of formerly sheltered economies, and has also served as
a vehicle for the internationalization of many of those economies.2
Even though its economy remains under tight government controls,
Cuba has recently joined the global trend towards encouraging foreign
investment. Cuban officials, as well as students of Cuban affairs on the
island and abroad, point to foreign investment as an important source
of hard currency and as one of the principal mechanisms on which the
current government relies to reverse the contraction of the country's
economy.'
New laws, regulations and practices implemented in the last few
years have succeeded in attracting a sizeable amount of foreign
1 Direct investment is defined as the establishment of a permanent relationship
between a party (the investor) and the object (some business operation), with the party
seeking to exert real influence over the object's operation. Foreign direct investment is the
acquisition of a lasting interest in an economy other than that of the investor. The definition
of foreign direct investment includes, in addition to actual investment transactions, extended
trade credits from a parent company to a foreign subsidiary; acquisition of shares of a foreign
enterprise; loans from a parent to its foreign subsidiary; a parent company's guarantee of a
subsidiary's loan; and self-financing over and above the normal consolidation requirements.
The aim of foreign direct investment according to the IMF definition is to "acquire a lasting
interest in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor, the
investor's purpose being to have an effective voice in the management of the enterprise."
Lars Oxelheim, Foreign Direct Investments and the Liberalization of Capital Movements, in THE
GLOBAL RACE FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 11 n.1 (Lars Oxelheim ed., 1993)
[hereinafter THE GLOBAL RACE FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT].
2 Id. at 1.
S Jorge Perez-Lopez, A Critical Look at Cuba's Foreign Investment Program 1-4, paper
presented at the 1995 Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Washington, D.C.
(Sept. 1995) [hereinafter Critical Look]; see also Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Cuba's Economic Strategies
for Confronting the Crisis, in CUBA AFTER THE COLD WAR 200-03 (Carmelo Mesa-Lago ed.,
1993) [hereinafter Confronting the Crisis]. A Cuban government official recently described
succinctly what Cuba seeks to get from foreign investments in the island as "market,
technology and working capital." Minister Says Light Industry to Undergo Reshaping Process,
PRENSA LATINA, June 5, 1995, translated in BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, June 13,
1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Bbcswb File.
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investment into Cuba.4 Foreign investment in Cuba has bolstered
certain economic sectors, particularly tourism, and has served to
expand the island's economic relations with other countries.5 The
impact of foreign investment in Cuba is, however, limited by the
country's political and economic program, which restrains foreign
investment in a number of significant respects.
6
As Cuba makes its transition to a free-market economy, foreign
investment will play an increasingly important role in the island's
economic reconstruction. 7 Cuba's laws affecting foreign investment
need to be updated as the transition unfolds to effectively regulate,
and at the same time foster, foreign investment in the country.
4 Cuban officials have claimed that the aggregate value of foreign investment in the
country as of mid-1995 amounted to over $2 billion. Cuba Reports Foreign Investment Exceeding
$2 Bn, REUTERS, July 10, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnews File; Trade Minister
Reports Growth in GDP, Commercial Trade, translated in BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS,
July 4, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Bbcswb File. These figures are probably quite
overstated, since the total investment by a foreign venturer is usually not known, is spread out
over a period of many years, and is contingent on many factors. The true figure of the
amount invested thus far by foreign investors is probably closer to $500 million. Thomas T.
Vogel, Jr., Investors Find Cuba Tantalizing Yet Murky in Financial Matters, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7,
1995, at Al; Critical Look, supra note 3, at 4-13. For catalogues of foreign joint ventures in
Cuba see An Index of Foreign Investment in Cuba, LA SOCIEDAD ECONOMICA, BULLETIN 43 (Sept.
1994); AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR FREE LABOR DEVELOPMENT, AFL-CIO, OILING THE CUBAN
GOVERNMENT MACHINE (Feb. 1995).
5 Prior to the current economic crisis, Cuba only encouraged what its officials called
"social tourism," in which sympathetic travelers from around the world were invited to come
to Cuba and were offered tours of model communes, sugar plantations, and other workplaces
where the achievements of Castro's socialism were put on display. T. BABUN GROUP, INC.,
CUBA-SUMMARY OF OPPORTUNITY (Oct. 1994) (no page numbers in document) [hereinafter
CUBA-SUMMARY OF OPPORTUNITY].
With the shift in emphasis to more traditional tourism in the late 1980s, the industry
became the focus of attention of many foreign investors. Tourism is projected to bring about
$1 billion (gross) in foreign exchange to Cuba in 1995. Frances Kerry, Cuba Forecasts Tripling
of Tourism by Year 2000, REUTERS BUSINESS REPORT, Apr. 27, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Reubus File. Other export industries are also being increasingly pursued and are
resulting in significant ventures by investors from many countries, notably Canada, Mexico,
Spain, France, and other European nations. Id see generally Larry Luxner, Investing in Cuba,
U.S./LATIN TRADE 38 (May 1994).
The United States is the only major country that is not involved in the expansion of
foreign investment in Cuba. The lack of U.S. presence in Cuba is due to the existence of a
tight embargo by the U.S. on trade with Cuba. This embargo was imposed in 1962 and
remains in effect to this date. See generally 22 USC § 2151 et seq. (1963).
6 See infra part II.E.
7 See Ernest H. Preeg, A Five Year Projection for a Restructured Cuba, in CUBA IN TRANSI-
TION-PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR
THE STUDY OF THECUBAN ECONOMY 153, 162 (Aug. 1993) [hereinafter ASCE-3]; ERNEST H.
PREEG & JONATHAN D. LEVINE, CUBA AND THE NEW CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ORDER 55-56
(Roberta Howard et. al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter PREEG & LEVINE]. Cuba is the largest
country in the Caribbean and has the potential to become the largest U.S. trading partner
in the region, once the sanctions have been lifted. THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED
STATES, A ROAD MAP FOR RESTRUCTURING FUTURE U.S. RELATIONS WITH CUBA 19 (1995).
The Atlantic Council study concludes that the level of trade will depend in large part on the
extent to which Cuba is allowed access to U.S. markets as well as the availability of financing.
Id.
FOREIGN INVESTMENT CODE
This article seeks to identify what should be the objectives of
Cuba's foreign investment legislation during its transition to a free-
market economy and to describe the main features that such legisla-
tion should contain in order to maximize direct foreign investment in
the island. Since foreign investment laws must be integrated with
other economic development legislation, the paper also seeks to
identify some of the key areas of interaction between foreign invest-
ment laws and other transition period legislation.
There is no "ideal" foreign investment code which could be copied
for use in Cuba. Even if such legislation existed, it would probably be
to a large extent inapplicable to Cuba due to the unique circumstances
that will exist during the country's market transition.' Certain features
in foreign investment laws and related legislation, however, are
recognized as creating an attractive climate for foreign investment.
These favorable features have been analyzed by scholars and incorpo-
rated into general guidelines for investment legislation, such as the
World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment
(hereinafter World Bank Guidelines).' The successes and failures of
countries making the transition from a command to a free-market
economy also provide insights into the probable results of particular
elements of foreign investment laws. These experiences should be
considered for their potential applicability to Cuba.
The discussion in this article reflects the above considerations.
Part II describes the foreign investment legislation that is in place in
Cuba today and summarizes its main shortcomings. Part III defines
what the objectives of foreign investment legislation for Cuba should
be in order to support the country's orderly transition to a free-market
economy. Part IV draws upon the preceding Part III to define the
recommended features and requirements of foreign investment
legislation for Cuba during its free-market transition. Part V discusses
the relationship between Cuban foreign investment legislation and
other transition period laws. Lastly, Part VI provides some pertinent
conclusions and recommendations.
8 A number of conditions unique to Cuba make the foreign investment environment
in the country potentially different from that of other countries with transitional economies.
These unique conditions include (1) the existence of a very large Cuban exile community
in the U.S., many of whose members are financially able to, and probably interested in,
investing in their home country; (2) the close proximity of Cuba to a vast natural trading
partner, the U.S.; (3) the pendency of expropriation claims by U.S. and Cuban nationals
amounting to billions of dollars against much of the property that would be suitable for
foreign investment; (4) the current critical economic condition of the country, which is likely
to persist into the transition period; (5) the probability of political instability during the
transition. See generally Critical Look, supra note 3, at 16-32.
9 IBRAHIM F. I. SHIHATA, LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT: THE WORLD
BANK GUIDELINES 155-64 (1993) [hereinafter LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT].
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II. Foreign Investment Legislation in Cuba Today
A. The 1982 Foreign Investment Law: Opening the Door to Foreign
Investment
Cuba had no foreign investment laws in place at the time of the
1959 Revolution, nor for more than twenty years thereafter. The
Cuban government issued the country's first foreign investment code
in 1982, Decree-Law No. 50 of February 15, 1982 (Law 50).0 This
legislation allowed foreign investors to enter into joint ventures with
state-owned enterprises in the development of specific projects and
authorized the repatriation of profits or dividends in convertible
currency." The law, however, imposed many restrictions on investors.
For example, in certain cases, it limited a foreign investor's share in a
joint venture to 49%, although investors could negotiate operational
control of the project. 2
Foreign investment in Cuba had been negligible since the early
days of the Revolution, and the 1982 foreign investment law, in itself,
failed to attract much foreign investment to the island. 3 Indeed, the
first foreign investment project in Cuba since the Revolution was
completed in 1990, eight years after Law 50 went into effect.'4
B. The Post-1989 Liberalization of Foreign Investment in Cuba
The year 1989 marked a watershed for the communist world: the
iron curtain collapsed and the countries of the Soviet bloc started to
make their transitions to democracy and free-market systems. That
year also witnessed the beginning of the disintegration of the Soviet
Union itself.5 The collapse of communism in Europe brought about
10 For a sympathetic description of the features of Law 50 and the business opportuni-
ties it created for foreign investors, see ADAR COMMUNICATIONS, INVESTING IN CUBA TODAY
21-29 (1993). But, for a discussion of the shortcomings of Law 50 see Jorge F. Perez-Lopez,
Odd Couples: Joint Ventures Between Foreign Capitalists and Cuban Socialists, NORTH-SOUTH
AGENDA PAPERS No. 16 (Nov. 1995) [hereinafter Joint Ventures].
11 BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, DEVELOPING BUSINESS STRATEGIES FOR CUBA
23-24 (1992) [hereinafter BUSINESS STRATEGIES FOR CUBA].
12 Id. at 23.
13 AntonioJorge & Robert D. Cruz, Foreign Investment Opportunities in Cuba: Evaluating
the Risks, in INVESTING IN CUBA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 17, 26 (Jaime Suchlicki & Antonio
Jorge eds., 1994) [hereinafter Jorge & Cruz); Critical Look, supra note 3, at 1.
14 The first joint venture between the socialist regime and a capitalist firm since the
Revolution was negotiated with the Spanish hotel chain of Sol-MeliI and resulted in the
opening of a hotel in Varadero Beach in 1990. That hotel is 50% owned by the Spanish
chain. BUSINESS STRATEGIES FOR CUBA, supra note 11, at 24.
15 Relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union began to deteriorate after the
introduction of perestroika and glastnost in the latter country. In 1986, Cuba launched an
economic counter-reform program (the Rectification Process) that set it against the
worldwide socialist current of market reform. Though Cuba was critical of the reforms in
other socialist countries, it continued to trade with and accept aid from the Soviet Union and
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a steep decline in the Cuban economy, which was dependent on
favorable trade relations with the nations of the Soviet bloc. 16  In
addition, all economic aid from the former Soviet Union was suspend-
ed in 1992 and trade was dramatically curtailed. 7 As a result of these
developments, Cuba's economic output declined by 50% between 1989
and 1993.18 During that period, the country's exports declined by
70%, imports dropped by 80%, and the gross domestic product
decreased by somewhere between 30% and 40%. 19
In response to the economic crisis, Cuba turned to foreign direct
investment.2 ° To attract such investment to the island, the govern-
ment significantly liberalized its foreign investment practices."
Amendments to the Cuban Constitution in 1992 eliminated some
important restrictions on foreign investment. As amended, the
Constitution permits property ownership by mixed enterprises and the
transfer of state property to joint ventures with foreign capital. 2
These constitutional amendments enabled the institution of a
more liberal foreign investment regime within the framework of Law
50.23 As set up after 1992, the foreign investment regime had the
following salient features:
other Soviet bloc nations. See generally Carmelo Mesa-Lago, The Last Communist Warrior, in
CUBA AFTER THE COLD WAR, supra note 3, at 4-11.
16 Ariel Terrero, Trade Statistics, New Measures Reported, BOHEMIA 30-35 (Oct. 1994),
translated in F.B.I.S. (LAT-94-234), Dec. 6, 1994 at 10; Carmelo Mesa-Lago, TheEconomic Effects
on Cuba of the Downfall of Socialism in the USSR and Eastern Europe, in CUBA AFTER THE COLD
WAR, [hereinafter MESA-LAGO ON THE DOWNFALL OF SOCIALISM], at 133-88.
17 MESA-LAGO ON THE DOWNFALL OF SOCIALISM, supra note 16, at 151; Berta E.
Hernandez Truyol, Out in Left Field: Cuba's Post-Cold War Strikeout; 18 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 15,
53 (1994).
18 SeeJorge & Cruz, supra note 13, at 17.
19 See Id. at 24; GILLIAN GUNN, CUBA IN TRANSmION-OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 28
(Gillian Gunn ed., 1993) [hereinafter CUBA IN TRANSITION]; COMISION ECONOMICA PARA
AMERICA LATINA, CUBA: EVOLUCION ECONOMICA DURANTE 1994 17 (May 1995).
20 CARMELO MESA-LAGO, ARE ECONOMIC REFORMS PROPELLING CUBA TO THE MARKET?
17 (1994) [hereinafter MESA-LAGO ON ECONOMIC REFORMS].
21 Id. at 34. In order to make itself more attractive to possible trading partners, the
Cuban government began in 1989 to form business-oriented Sociedades Anonimas ("SAs").
SAs are state-owned enterprises, organized like corporations and acting in many respects like
private companies (e.g., they hold foreign exchange in offshore accounts, serve as trading
partners to foreign investors, and can hire and fire at will). See CUBA IN TRANSITION, supra
note 19, at 34.
22 See CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA (1992) [Constitution] art. 23 (Cuba),
published in Gaceta Oficial (Aug. 1, 1992) at 36 [hereinafter CONSTrrUCION DE 1992]. Article
23 provides that:
The State recognizes the right of mixed enterprises, corporations and economic
associations established in accordance with the law to own property. The use,
enjoyment and disposition of the assets which are the property of the above
mentioned enterprises shall be governed by the provisions of the laws and treaties,
as well as by the enterprises' own articles of incorporation and bylaws.
23 See Jorge & Cruz, supra note 13, at 26; GARETH JENKINS & LILA HAINES, CUBA:
PROSPECTS FOR REFORM, TRADE AND INVESTMENT 65 (1994) [hereinafter CUBA PROSPECTS].
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1) Foreign ownership of up to 49% of an enterprise's shares. (In
special cases, such as tourism, mining, and Latin-America based
investments, foreigners were allowed to own 51% or more of an
enterprise's shares.);
2) Total exemption of taxes on gross income, personal income, and
the transfer of real estate and businesses. The only taxes levied
were 30% on profits and 25% on the payroll, to cover social
security benefits for Cuban employees. Even those taxes could be
waived or deferred at the discretion of the government;
3) Elimination of customs duties for necessary imports of equipment
and inputs;
4) Unrestricted repatriation in hard currency of dividends, profits,
and the salaries of foreign employees;
5) Freedom in hiring foreign executives and technical personnel;
6) State handling of the labor force, including disciplining of
workers, a ban on strikes, and relatively low wages (to be paid in
hard currency by the investor) for Cuban labor;
7) State insurance covering lost profits due to accident, non-payment
of merchandise, and non-fulfillment of terms of contracts due to
political conditions; and
8) Availability of government support in areas such as legal, econom-
ic, accounting, and information services.24
In addition to the general arrangements described above, the
Cuban government sought to negotiate special deals in which foreign
investment played an important role.25 Cuba has also signed bilateral
investment treaties (BITs)26 with several countries; these agreements
contain, inter alia, promises not to expropriate investor property and
to allow repatriation of investor profits.27 These guarantees are
intended to provide further assurances to foreign venturers that their
investments are secure.2
24 MEsA-LAGO ON ECONOMIC REFORMS, supra note 20, at 17; CUBA PROSPECTS, supra
note 23, at 65-68.
25 The Cuban Government has sought to negotiate debt-for-equity schemes to reduce
some of its foreign debt obligations by offering some state enterprises to investors from
creditor nations. For example, Cuba has converted part of its outstanding $310 million debt
to Mexico to equity by Mexican entrepreneurs in joint ventures: in September 1994, a
contract was signed between Cubapetroleo, S.A. (Cubpet), and the Mexican enterprise of
Mexpetrol under which Cubpet would keep 51% ownership of the joint venture, while
Mexpetrol would have 49% ownership in exchange for a commitment to finish and upgrade
the heavily underutilized oil refinery at Cienfuegos. In a similar agreement, Cemex, a
Mexican cement manufacturer, reportedly invested $40 million to purchase a one-half interest
of the Mariel cement plant. Both of these ventures include significant debt-for-equity swap
components. Joint Ventures, supra note 10, at 17; Critical Look, supra note 3, at 8-10.
26 ALAN C. SWAN & JOHN F. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 717 (1991).
27 Michael Z. Wise, The New Cuban Invasion, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Feb. 1995, at 71.
Cuba has signed BITs with Britain, China, Colombia, Germany, Italy, Russia, and Spain. Id.
28 Id; CUBA PROSPECTS, supra note 23, at 69-70.
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C. Recent Foreign Investment Experience in Cuba
The entire Cuban economy, with the exception of health care and
education, was declared open to foreign investment in 1994.29 The
main sectors where significant foreign investment has taken place
include tourism, light industry, medical equipment and medicine
production, mining, oil exploration, construction, and agro-industry.
30
Up to the present time, foreign investments in Cuba have taken
one of three forms:
1) Joint ventures, in which a Cuban partner and a foreign partner
invest jointly in a project. (This option includes management
contracts, in which the foreign venturer provides the management
skills to run the enterprise and the Cuban partner provides all or
most capital assets-an arrangement particularly common in the
tourism industry.);
2) Production agreements, in which Cuba supplies the labor and
facilities and the foreign partner supplies equipment and
materials, or provides advance credit. The foreign partner often
becomes an exporter or distributor;
3) Joint accounts, in which the foreign partner manufactures and
distributes abroad products designed in Cuba. *Thus, the foreign
partner assumes the risks but reaps the profits."
The most commonly used format has been the formation ofjoint
ventures between the foreign party and a Cuban enterprise which is
either an existing state instrumentality or a "private" SA formed by the
Cuban government.3 2 Over 200 such ventures have been established
in the last five years. 3 While the foreign investor was generally not
allowed to assume a majority interest in a joint venture, there have
been a number of instances in which majority ownership by the foreign
29 Roberto F. Campos, Council of State's Lage on Expanding Foreign Investment, PRENSA
LATINA, Oct. 30, 1994, available in F.B.I.S. (LAT-94-210), Oct. 31, 1994 at 12-13. Despite these
broad assertions, the areas of the economy available for foreign investment remain limited.
Thus, Vice Minister for Foreign Investment Octavio Castillo stated recently: "The open
features [of the new foreign investment law] do not commit in any case the capital or assets
of sugar mills, railroads, machinery or even less the land. In other words, the country is still
ours, under the old or the new legislation." RADIO PROGRESO, Aug. 22, 1995, broadcast, on
file with authors.
so See generally CuBA-SUMMARY OF OPPORTUNrIY, supra note 5; CUBA PROSPECrS, supra
note 23.
31 CUBA IN TRANSITION, supra note 19, at 33; Critical Look, supra note 3, at 7-11.
32 See generally Jorge Perez-Lopez, The North-South Agenda Papers (1995) [hereinafter
North-South Agenda Papers].
33 As of mid-1995, Cuba reported it had established 212 economic associations,
includingjoint ventures, with foreign partners. Cuba Reports Foreign Investment Exceeding $2 Bn,
supra note 4. Spain leads the way in terms of the number of joint ventures undertaken by
its nationals in Cuba, but Mexico and Canada surpass Spain in the reported total amount of
investment. Jose A. Ferrs & Pascal Fletcher, Spain Exploits Old Ties in New Havana-The Former
Colonial Power is Helping to Lead the Way in Investment in Cuba, FIN. TIMES, July 20, 1995, at 4.
19961
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venturer was approved. 4
Despite the post-1989 liberalization of Cuban foreign investment
law, foreign investors still have had to cope with an abundance of risks
and red tape. One of the shortcomings of Law 50 was that the joint
ventures it authorized between foreign investors and state entities
required case by case negotiation and individual approval by the
Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers. 5 In addition,
Cuban laws failed to provide explicit guarantees against expropria-
tion-an important omission given the uncompensated expropriation
of more than $2 billion worth of foreign-owned assets in 1959 and
1960.6 Foreign investors also had to contend with the possibility that
the Cuban government might unilaterally terminate a venture-as
apparently has happened in more than one case-or that an enterprise
could become subject to a restitution claim deriving from the
expropriation of foreign assets after the Revolution.37
D. Cuba's New Foreign Investment Law
On September 5, 1995, Cuba's National Assembly of People's
Power (the country's highest legislative body) enacted a new foreign
investment law, Law No. 77 of 1995 ("Law 77"), to replace Law 50.8
34 Gareth Jenkins & Lila Haines, Cuba: Prospects for Reform, Trade and Investment (The
Economist Intelligence Unit) (1994), at 67 [hereinafter Prospects for Reform].
35 MESA-LAGO ON ECONOMIC REFORMS, supra note 20, at 17; Wise, supra note 27, at 71.
The protracted foreign investment approval process was further delayed in mid-1995 when
allegations surfaced that bribes and kickbacks were being paid to government officials by
prospective investors in exchange for approvals. See, e.g., Christopher Marquis, Cuba Takes
a Hard Look at its Reforms, THE MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 3, 1995, at 1A, Susana Lee, Un Alerta Para
Ser Mas Disciplinados, Austeros y Eficientes, GRANMA, July 13, 1995, at 3; Michael McGuire &
George de Lama, Cuba Accountants New Guardians Against Corruption, CHICAGO TRIB.,July 17,
1995, at 1.
36 Cuba expropriated most U.S. and other foreign-owned property on the island starting
in 1959, with the bulk of the expropriations taking place in the second half of 1960. In a
parallel process, most assets owned by Cuban nationals, except for small parcels of land,
homes, and personal items were expropriated at various times between 1959 and 1968. See
Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Some Legal and Practical Issues in the Resolution of Cuban Nationals'
Expropriation Claims Against Cuba, 16 U. PA.J. INT'L Bus. L. 217, 220 (1995) [hereinafter
Travieso-Diaz on Claims].
37 Critical Look, supra note 3, at 20, 24.
38 LEY NUMERO 77 DE LA INVERSION EXTRANJERA, published in Gaceta Oficial, Sep. 6,
1995. The law went through at least seven drafts over the course of a year; the authors were
able to review Drafts 3 (dated Mar. 13, 1995), 6 (dated June 8, 1995) and 7 (dated Aug. 25,
1995). A review of the incomplete "legislative history" of this law provides interesting insights
into the political establishment's power to water down some of the more significant changes
that were initially proposed to the country's foreign investment regime. For example, in
Draft 3 the decision whether to approve a proposed investment was vested (except in
enumerated areas) in the Ministry of Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation
(MINVEC). Law 77, Draft 3, art. 20 (on file with the authors). As finally enacted, foreign
investment approvals are left, as they were under Law 50, in the hands of the Executive
Committee of the Council of Ministers or some unspecified "Government Commission" it
may designate. Law 77, art. 21. As these changes were being made, Cuban officials such as
MINVEC Minister Ernesto Melendez continued to extol the innovative features of the new
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Predictably, Law 77 does not represent a fresh start but retains many
of the provisions as well as the generally restrictive investment climate
of Law 50. However, some of the changes in Law 77 represent
potentially significant improvements from the previous law, and if
implemented could help liberalize the island's basic economic
structure.39
1. Major Similarities to Law 50
Law 77 retains the basic structure of Law 50. The familiar forms
of business organization in Law 50 (joint ventures, production
agreements, and joint accounts) are retained in the new law. But Law
77 also creates a new form of investment vehicle: the "enterprise with
wholly foreign capital."4°
Approval of investments is still done on a case-by-case basis. The
Ministry of Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation is charged
with supervising foreign investment activities, receiving foreign
investment applications, and submitting them for approval to the
Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers or to a yet to be
established Commission appointed by that Committee.4 A decision
on whether to approve an application must be reached within sixty
days from the date of the application, and is not appealable. 2
The new law sets out to establish a centralized processing system
by granting MINVEC primary authority to "receive and evaluate the
law, stating inter alia that it would "establish more flexible mechanisms and specific regulatory
elements to improve its clarity." Minister Interviewed on Foreign Investment in Sugar, Real Estate,
Banking, translated in BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS,June 20,1995, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Bbcswb File [hereinafter Foreign Investment in Sugar].
39 Cuba's new law bears some similarities to the current Vietnamese foreign investment
law. Thus, Vietnam's law, like Cuba's, also allows 100% foreign ownership of enterprises
established in that country, guarantees rights of investors to repatriate invested capital and
profits, and provides explicit guarantees against expropriation of foreign investments. Note,
Protection of Foreign Direct Investment in a New World Order: Vietnam-A Case Study, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1995, 2003-05 (1994).
40 Law 77, supra note 38, art. 12, 15. One aspect of Law 77 that caused considerable
debate during its consideration by the National Assembly was its definition of foreign investor
as "a natural or juridical person residing abroad and having foreign capital," a definition that
potentially includes Cuba expatriates. Id., art. 2(1). In his intervention in the debate of the
new law, President Castro had to defend the inclusion of Cuban expatriates among potential
investors. Cuba Expected to Open Economy, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 5, 1995.
41 Law 77, supra note 38, art. 21(1). The Executive Committee of the Council of
Ministers retains the sole power to approve the most important types of new foreign
investments, including those in which the total capital contribution is in excess of $10 million;
those in the form of enterprises with wholly foreign capital; those involving public works or
services; those in which the foreign enterprise has foreign government participation; those
involving the exploitation of natural resources; those involving the transfer of state assets or
state-owned real estate; and investments involving military-owned enterprises. Id., art. 21(2).
42 Id., art. 23(6). The law does not specify how that 60-day approval deadline is to be
enforced, particularly against the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers; nor does
it state the consequences of that deadline being missed. The law also does not address the
pre-application process of negotiations between the investor and the authorities.
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investment applications." Nevertheless, authorization from the
Council of Ministers, as well as from other interested state entities, will
still be required." The result is likely to be a continuation of the
cumbersome and unpredictable approval process now in place.45
The provisions on profit repatriation remain basically the same.
Since the new foreign investment law contains provisions (discussed
below) that commit the state to provide compensation in the event of
expropriation and allow foreign investors to sell their shares in joint
ventures, Law 77 lists moneys received pursuant to those provisions
among the authorized forms of profit repatriation.46 The new law
also authorizes the repatriation in hard currency of any amounts
received upon the winding up of the enterprise.47
The new law generally retains Law 50's system of labor regulation
for foreign investments. Enterprises with wholly foreign capital must
still hire workers indirectly, that is, they must contract for labor with a
designated state labor supply agency.4" (As in the old law, foreign
investors are free to employ foreigners in upper management and
technical positions.49) The state (via the labor supply agency) is still
responsible for disciplining workers and for resolving disputes between
foreign investors and their employees.50 The foreign venturers must
still pay wages in hard currency to the labor supply agency, which in
turn pays the employees in pesos, thus pocketing the difference."
Foreign employees, however, will continue to be able to repatriate their
salaries in hard currencies.5
2
The new code, however, creates a potential exception to the
43 See id., art. 20-25.
44 The MINVEC is required to forward a summary of the foreign investment application
to "such other agencies and instrumentalities as may be pertinent" to secure the views of
these entities in the areas of their competence. Id., art. 23(4).
45 Foreign investment application approvals are contained in "investment authoriza-
tions," which are official documents that set forth the conditions to which the investment is
subject, and the objectives and authorized duration of the investment. Id., art. 24. The
investor may seek clarification from MINVEC as to the conditions for the investment's
approval. Id., art. 25. The process of negotiating the terms of the venture and securing the
investment authorization has been so dilatory in the past that it has caused a number of
prospective investors to give up on their plans. Annet Cardenas Vega, Foreign Investments:
Business in Good Legislation, PRENSA LATINA, Aug. 14, 1995, translated in BBC SUMMARY OF
WORLD BROADCASTS, Aug. 22, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Bbcswb File.
46 Law 77, supra note 38, art. 3, 6 & 8.
47 Id., art. 4 & 8.
48 Id., art. 33(3). MINVEC is to designate an "employing enterprise" which will be
responsible for hiring workers and contracting them out to the foreign investor. Id.
49 Id., art. 31(2).
50 Id., art. 34(1). However, in the event employee claims are settled by the labor supply
agency, the agency has the right of indemnification against the foreign venturer. Id., art. 34(2). 51 Minister Explains Foreign Investment Law, LA VANGUARDIA, Oct. 8, 1995, available in
F.B.I.S. (LAT-95-198), Oct. 13, 1995, at 6-7.
52 MESA-LAGO ON ECONOMiC REFORMS, supra note 20, at 17.
[Vol. 21
FOREIGN INVESTMENT CODE
official labor regime by stating ambiguously that a foreign investor in
ajoint venture with a Cuban partner may be authorized in exceptional
cases to utilize a different labor arrangement from that specified in the
law.53
Finally, Law 77 maintains the existing tax structure for foreign
investors. Foreign investors must pay taxes on net profits at 30% and
payroll taxes at 25% to cover social security benefits. 4 The tax rate
on profits for investments that exploit renewable or non-renewable
natural resources can be increased by the Cuban Government up to
50%, depending on the natural resource being exploited.5
The Ministry of Finance, in consultation with the MINVEC, can
declare a foreign investment temporarily exempt from all or some of
the applicable taxes. 6 Likewise, the new law states that special
reductions in any applicable tariffs may be granted to foreign investors
by Cuba's Customs Service on a case-by-case basis.57  Thus, the tax
regime for foreign investors under Law 77 remains as subject to the
discretion of the government as it was under Law 50.
2. Significant New Provisions in Law 77
Perhaps the most significant new provision in Law 77 is an express
guarantee against uncompensated expropriation of the property of
foreign investors. 8 The state also promises to "protect" the investor
53 Art. 33(1) of Law 77 states in pertinent part: "In exceptional cases, the authorization
that approves ajoint venture may stipulate that all or some of the persons rendering services
to the joint venture may be hired directly by the venture, always in accordance with the terms
of the laws in effect with respect to contracting labor." While there is no indication in the
law or in the pronouncements of Cuban government officials as to when such an exceptional
case might occur, it has been suggested that the existing labor regime may be modified in
the free trade zones (further discussed below) which Cuba plans to open in the near future.
Cuba's Business Law Puts Off Foreigners, WALL ST.J., Oct. 10, 1995, at A16.
There is also a residual provision regarding labor in art. 35 of Law 77, which reads: "The
authorization that approves a foreign venture may set forth labor regulations that are differ-
ent from those set forth in the preceding Articles. " Id. It is unclear whether this additional
provision further enlarges the exception set forth in art. 33.
54 Id., art. 39(a), (c). However, the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers
can, in cases where for reasons of national interest it deems it convenient to do so, waive
wholly or in part the payment of net profit taxes to the extent those are reinvested in the
country. Id. Joint ventures and economic association arrangements are exempt from
payment of individual income taxes, whereas enterprises with wholly foreign capital are liable
for those taxes. Id., art. 39(d).
55 Id., art. 39(b).
56 Id., art. 43.
57 Id., art. 41.
58 Article 3 of Law 77 reads:
Foreign investments in the national territory enjoy full protection and safety, and
cannot be expropriated except for those actions taken for reasons of public utility
or social interest, as declared by the Government in accordance with the Constitu-
tion and the laws in effect, and the Agreements for the Promotion and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments, and subject to prior indemnification in freely convertible
currency in an amount equal to the commercial value of the investment, as mutually
agreed or as assessed by an international organization with recognized expertise in
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against third party claims, to the extent such claims are in accordance
with Cuba's laws and the rulings of Cuba's courts. 9 Compensation
for expropriation is to be given in a convertible currency, although the
amount and type of currency are left to be determined by agreement
of the parties or, in the case of disagreement, by an experienced
"international organization" chosen by the foreign investor in
conjunction with MINVEC.6°
Another important new provision allows investments by "enterpris-
es with wholly foreign capital"-that is, investments without Cuban
equity participation.6' Such enterprises can be established in two
different ways: 1) by the foreign individual or entity registering in its
own name with the Chamber of Commerce of Cuba; or 2) by setting
up a wholly-owned Cuban corporation as a subsidiary of the foreign
entity.6
2
Allowing foreign investors to operate as sole proprietorships or
through wholly-owned subsidiaries not only expands the types of
business organizations available to foreign investors but also moves
Cuba's foreign investment legislation closer to internationally-recog-
nized standards for foreign investment legislation. Experience in other
countries shows that allowing 100% foreign ownership of enterprises
is necessary to attract substantial amounts of foreign investment,
particularly to countries with economies in transition.63 If enterprises
wholly owned by foreign investors are allowed to acquire the assets of
state-owned enterprises, their doing so could signify the start of the
privatization of state enterprises in Cuba.
The possibility that the Cuban government will allow the acquisi-
tion of state-owned assets by foreign investors raises issues regarding
the status of title to properties expropriated after the 1959 Revolution.
Cuban nationals and foreigners have outstanding property expropria-
tion claims totaling billions of dollars.'4 The claims by U.S. nationals
certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission alone total $1.8
billion in 1960 dollars, not counting interest.65 If assets subject to
business valuation, authorized by the Minister of Finance and Prices and engaged
for that purpose through agreement between the parties or by agreement between
the investor and the MINVEC in the case of an enterprise with wholly foreign
capital.
Id.
59 Id., art. 5.
60 Id., art. 3.
61 Id., art. 12(c), 15.
62 Id., art. 15(2). It should be noted, however, that President Castro has warned that
very few businesses will be authorized to operate as 100% foreign-owned ventures. Douglas
Farah, Socialist Cuba Alters Course to Spur Foreign Investment, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 1995 at A25.
63 See infra part IV.B.3.
64 For a discussion of the Cuban expropriations and claims arising thereunder see
Travieso-Diaz on Claims, supra note 36.
65 Id.
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expropriation claims were acquired by foreign investors, resolving the
expropriation claims and delaying the lifting of the U.S. trade embargo
against Cuba may be difficult because the resolution of the property
claims of U.S. nationals is one of the conditions necessary to lift the
embargo. 66
Another provision enables foreign investors to acquire interests in
real estate, but only in limited situations and subject to the specific
approval of Cuba's Council of Ministers. 67  Investments in real estate
can only be made in structures intended as personal dwellings or
vacation homes of non-resident foreign individuals, residences of
foreign investor officials, or corporate offices. 68 The acquisition of
structures does not include, the acquisition of the underlying land.
More importantly, the term "acquisition" is not defined, and the
conditions under which the real estate is acquired are to be set in the
authorization issued to the foreign investor and are therefore subject
to ad-hoc determination by the Cuban authorities.69  For all intents
and purposes, the real estate rights acquired by investors are just long
or medium term leases of the improvements.
66 Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Requirements for Lifting the U.S. Trade Embargo Against Cuba 23
(unpublished manuscript, on file with The University of Miami Yearbook of International Law)
[hereinafter Travieso-Diaz on the Embargo]. To further complicate matters, on March 5,
1996, the United States enacted the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-114, 109 Stat. 785, popularly known as the "Helms-Burton Bill" or the
"Libertad Act". Tide III of the Libertad Act grants a right to U.S. nationals whose property
was confiscated by the Cuban government to bring actions for money damages in U.S. federal
district courts against foreign nationals or foreign governments that "traffic" in their
confiscated properties. Trafficking is defined broadly as "knowingly and intentionally" selling,
transferring, distributing, dispensing, brokering, managing, or otherwise disposing of
confiscated property, or purchasing, leasing, receiving, possessing, obtaining control of,
managing, using or otherwise acquiring or holding an interest in confiscated proper-
ty;engagning in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated property;
or causing, directing, participating in or profiting from trafficking by another person or
otherwise engagning in trafficking through another person, without the authorization of any
United States national who holds a claim to the property. Libertad Act, 109 Stat. 785, at tit.
III.
Initial reports following enactment of the Libertad Act suggest that a number of foreign
investors operating in Cuba may withdraw from the island, and others who were considering
investing in Cuba are likely to change their plans. Pascal Fletcher, U.S. Embargo May Stall
Foreign Cash, FINANCIAL TIMES SURVEY OF LATIN AMERICA FINANCE AND INVESTMENT, Mar. 25,
1996, at vi; Pascal Fletcher, Cuba Retreats Behind Hardline Policies, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1996,
at 6; Peter Morton, Canadian Firms Face Cuba Fallout: Sweeping Power of U.S. Law Puts
Coporations with Links to Havana on the Defensive, FIN. POST, Mar. 13, 1996, at 1; Elena Cherney,
Mountain of Cuban Sugar is Anathema to Americans: Sweetening with the Enemy, THE GAZETTE
(Montreal), Mar. 16, 1996, at Dl.
67 Law 77, supra note 38, arts. 16, 21(2)(f).
68 Id., art. 16(2).
69 Id., art. 18. In a June 1995 interview, Cuba's foreign investment minister clarified
that the real estate investments that are being allowed in Cuba involve only giving
"usufructuary property rights to companies comprising Cuban and foreign partners without
transferring property rights as established by our constitution... under no circumstance is
the ownership of the property compromised." Foreign Investment in Sugar, supra note 38, at
7.
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. Finally, the new Cuban foreign investment law authorizes the
establishment of a system of "duty-free and industrial park zones,"
which are a form of Export Processing Zones (EPZs).7° Special
incentives may be granted to enterprises located in these zones. These
incentives are not defined in the law, but they are said to relate to
"customs, currency exchange rates, taxes, labor, immigration, public
order, investment and foreign trade."7' The types of activities which
may be carried out in the duty-free zones include importation,
exportation, storage, product modification, re-export and financial
operations.
72
It is unlikely that the duty-free zones will attract large amounts of
foreign investment. The worldwide performances of EPZs in attracting
investment is said to have been lackluster.73 In addition, the success
of EPZs (particularly in the Caribbean) depends to a large extent on
trade concessions from importing countries, which stimulate foreign
investors to establish manufacturing facilities for export products
(maquiladoras) in the EPZs. 74 An example of the effect of these
concessions is the success of the Dominican Republic's EPZs in
attracting apparel maquiladoras which take advantage of reduced
quotas and import duties for their products under the United States
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) program. Operation of these EPZs is,
at least in part, responsible for the tripling of the Dominican Repub-
lic's apparel exports between 1987 and 1991. 71 Cuba presently is not
eligible for CBI benefits, and it will continue to be ineligible as long as
current U.S. policy towards Cuba remains in effect.76 In addition,
70 Law 77, supra note 38, art. 50.
71 Id., art. 51.
72 Id. Cuban officials have characterized the development of EPZs as something "for
the future." Head of Chamber of Commerce Assesses Foreign Investment, PRENSA LATINA, June 7,
1995 translated in BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, June 20, 1995, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Bbcswb File. On the other hand, a bill for the creation of free zones and
industrial parks is reported to be under review. Creation of Free Zones, Industrial Parks Believed
Possible, RADIO REBELDE, Nov. 21, 1995, available in F.B.I.S. (LAT-95-227), Nov. 27, 1995, at
6.
73 OECD, INVESTMENT INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES: EFFECTS ON INTERNATIONAL
DIRECT INVESTMENT 53 (1989) [hereinafter OECD on FDI].
74 Alejandro Ferrate, Foreign Direct Investment in Costa Rica after the "Death" of C.B.I., J.
INT'L LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming Summer 1996).
75 U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF A NORTH AMERICAN
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT ON APPAREL INVESTMENT IN CBERA COUNTRIES 16-18 (1992)
[hereinafter POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF NAFTA ON CBI].
76 Travieso-Diaz on the Embargo, supra note 66, at 43. Under current legislation, the
President cannot "designate a country as a CBI beneficiary 1) if it is a communist country;
2) if it has nationalized, expropriated, or seized U.S. property, or unduly infringed other
property rights of U.S. citizens; 3) if it has not respected arbitration awards to U.S. parties;
4) if it affords preferential treatment to the products of another developed country which
adversely affects U.S. commerce; 5) if its government violates U.S. copyrights; 6) unless it has
agreed to extradite U.S. citizens; and 7) unless it is taking steps to afford internationally
recognized worker rights." Id.
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even if Cuba were eligible for CBI benefits, the conclusion of NAFTA
and the phasing out of the Multi-Fiber Agreement quotas under the
Uruguay Round of the GATT have severely impaired the value of CBI
benefits as investment incentives in beneficiary countries.77
E. Current Constraints on Foreign Investment in Cuba
The present state of Cuba's foreign investment law is not unlike
that of similar laws in Central and Eastern European countries, such
as Hungary, the former Czechoslovakia, and Poland, prior to their
transition to free-market economies. 78 Like those countries, Cuba is
still imposing constraints on foreign investment in order to control the
investment process. In addition, there are external factors that prevent
the widespread entry of foreign investment into Cuba.
1. Constraints Placed on Foreign Investment by Cuba
Despite the relative liberalization of Cuba's foreign investment law,
there remain a number of restraints imposed by Cuba on foreign
investment. The following significant restrictions are still in effect:
79
a) Foreign joint ventures still have to be individually authorized by
the Cuban government, in a process that in the past has been
protracted and has involved successive reviews by several agencies,
with Fidel Castro as the ultimate decision-maker in the approval
of the venture. It does not appear that the new foreign invest-
ment law will do much to alleviate this problem;
b) Until recently, ventures were only permitted in selected areas of
the economy; other areas, like the sugar industry, were considered
off-limits. Investment in sugar is now starting, but is still limited
to the pre-financing of sugar crops and loans towards the
acquisition of fuel, fertilizers, herbicides, spare parts, and other
inputs rather than the transfer of ownership or control of
productive assets which remain in the hands of the state;80
c) Investments directed at developing the internal Cuban market are
generally not allowed because the objective of encouraging foreign
investment is to secure foreign exchange via exports;
77 See generally Renee T. Legierski, Note, Out in the Cold: The Combined Effects of NAFTA
and the MFA on the Caribbean Basin Textile Industy, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 305 (1993).
78 For example, up to 1988 foreign investors could only operate in Hungary as minority
partners in joint ventures with domestic enterprises. ZBIGNIEW DOBOSIEwIcz, FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE 45 (1992).
79 See generally Critical Look, supra note 3.
80 See Foreign Investment in Sugar, supra note 38, at 3; see also Sugar Slump Blights Improving
Cuban Economy, REUTERS, July 21, 1995; Dutch ING Financing 20 Pct. of Cuban Sugar, REUTERS,
Apr. 4, 1995; Mercedes-Benz Renews Commercial Operations in County, EFE, July 25, 1995. Pre-
financing of Cuba's production of various commodities is now taking place with the backing
of several European banks. Pascal Fletcher, Western Banks Test the Waters in Cuba: Hopes are
High that a Pioneering Presence Will Bring Later Gains, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1995, at 4.
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d) Foreign investors are still not permitted to acquire title to the
properties in which they invest;
e) Ajoint venture can still be terminated by the Cuban government
essentially at will, with all property in Cuba involved in the venture
remaining in the hands of the state;
f) Contacts between the foreign investor and the internal economy
of the country, and the population at large, are rather limited;
g) Foreign venturers cannot hire labor directly, but must choose
from a government-selected pool of candidates. The joint
venturer must pay the Cuban agency that supplies the labor
relatively high salaries in convertible currency, while the agency
pays workers low salaries in pesos;
h) The Cuban Government remains in control over the investment
process and can dictate arbitrarily the terms under which each
investment is authorized and when it is to come to an end.
Thus, although the new foreign investment law may create a
somewhat improved framework for foreign investment in the island,
Cuba's successful transition to a free-market economy will require a far
greater liberalization to the country's foreign investment regime than
the new law provides. This has been demonstrated by the disappoint-
ing results thus far of the new legislation: no major new investments
have been announced since Law 77 was enacted, and the amount of
foreign investment going into Cuba remains limited."'
2. External Constraints on Foreign Investment in Cuba
In addition to the internal constraints on foreign investment
presented by Cuba's current regulatory environment, foreign invest-
ment is hampered by two main types of external constraints. First,
Cuba is largely isolated from the international monetary and financial
system because of its massive external debt burden, which denies it
access to international credit.8" Second, Cuba is cut off from the U.S.
market because the United States maintains a stringent trade embargo
against Cuba and actively seeks to discourage trade and investment on
the island by other nations. While a detailed discussion of these
constraints is outside the scope of this paper, brief mention will be
made of them to complete the picture of the foreign investment
outlook in Cuba.
a. Cuba's External Debt
Cuba's external debt situation is bleak. Even before the collapse
of the Soviet Union, Cuba owed over $9 billion (not counting accrued
81 Cuba Business Law Puts Off Foreigners, supra note 53; Peter Katel, Doing Business by the
Little Red Book, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1995 at A9.
82 Cuba Releases Details of its External Debt J. CoM., Nov. 20, 1995, at A8.
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interest) to international private and public lenders in the West, and
had defaulted on its loan obligations. 83  As a result, Cuba is not
eligible for credit from Paris Club members or private lenders. 4
Also, Cuba owes Russia, as successor to the Soviet Union, about
$30 billion in loans that it has never repaid.85
Cuba is also not a member of the IMF86 and does not receive
export credits from foreign governments except for Spain and France,
which are actively encouraging their nationals to do business in
Cuba.87 The country's inability to secure credit from the world's
financial institutions restricts its ability to finance projects and limits
both the number of investors and the types of investment projects that
can be undertaken.
b. The U.S. Trade Embargo
The U.S. trade embargo is also a factor that restricts foreign
investment in Cuba. The embargo prohibits U.S. individuals and
companies, and their foreign subsidiaries, from doing business in
Cuba.88 Moreover, the U.S. pursues a policy of actively seeking to
discourage third country entrepreneurs from investing in Cuba.89
One of the arguments used by the U.S., sometimes effectively, to
discourage third country investors from going into Cuba is that many
of the joint ventures solicited by Cuba involve properties that were
confiscated from U.S. citizens.9° The U.S. warns that investment in
such properties could lead to litigation against the investors now or in
the event of a change of government in Cuba.9 Also, it is sometimes
said that those investing in Cuba might be subject to adverse action by
a successor government coming to power on the island.92
83 Id; Mesa-Lago on the Downfall of Socialism, supra note 15, at 151; see also PREEG &
LEVINE, supra note 7, at 57.
84 In 1986, Cuba unsuccessfully sought to renegotiate debt payments with its Paris Club
creditors, and afterwards declared a moratorium on debt-services payments. Because of
Cuba's drop in creditworthiness, it was forced to rely mostly on trade with socialist countries
and to curtail sharply hard currency imports. ASCE-3, supra note 7, at 27. See also Thomas
T. Vogel, Jr., Cuba Seeks to Revamp Its Default Debt, WALL ST. J., June 26, 1995, at Cl.
85 MESA-LAGO ON ECONOMIC REFORMS, supra note 20, at 5.
86 CUBA IN TRANSITION, supra note 7, at 32.
87 CUBA PROSPECTS, supra note 23, at 57.
88 Id. at 39-42.
89 North-South Agenda Papers, supra note 32, at 25.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 See generally Jorge & Cruz, supra note 13, at 38-42. Because of the perceived
regulatory, political and economic risks of investing in Cuba, the island is regarded as a poor
prospect by potential investors. See, e.g., Doing Business by the Little Red Book, supra, note 81.
In its March 1995 semi-annual survey of country investment and credit risks, the magazine
Euromoney ranked Cuba 183rd out of 187 countries surveyed in terms of investment and credit
worthiness. The survey was based on the countries' existing debt burden, access to
international financing, economic performance, and political risk. Cuba scored very low in
all those categories. Charles Piggot, U.S. Has Passed Its Peak, EUROMONEY, Mar. 1995, at 149.
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As noted earlier, recently enacted U.S. legislation-the Libertad
Act- 9 greatly increases the potential for litigation in the U.S. against
investors from other nations doing business in Cuba, and subjects such
investors to potential sanctions in the areas of immigration, trade, and
financing.94 While the long-range effects of this legislation remain to
be seen, it is likely that it will further cloud the picture for the third
party nationals contemplating investing in Cuba.95
III. Objectives of a Foreign Investment Code for a Country in
Transition
Foreign investment legislation can seek two goals which are largely
contradictory: on the one hand, enabling and fostering the entry of
foreign investment; on the other, regulating and controlling such
investment to minimize its adverse impacts on the host country. Which
of these two goals is pursued at a given time depends on the philoso-
phy of the government in power, as well as on prevailing political and
economic conditions.
Until the last decade, a "provider mentality" pervaded most
developing countries, particularly those with an abundance of natural
resources. This mentality was based on the belief that having "an
ample stock of natural resources was what made a country rich and its
products competitive."96  This mentality caused many countries to
effectively close their doors to perceived exploiters-investors from
industrialized countries and multi-national corporations.97 Thus,
countries enacted laws that emphasized the regulatory and exclusionary
aspects of foreign investment legislation and thereby tended to
93 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-468,
109 Star. 785 (1996).
94 Id.
95 Title III of the Libertad Act grants a right to U.S. nationals whose property was
confiscated by the Cuban government to bring actions for money damages in U.S. federal
district courts against foreign nationals or foreign governments that "traffic" in the
confiscated properties, where "trafficking" is defined very broadly. Libertad Act, 109 Stat.
785, at tit. III.
Initial reports following enactment of the Libertad Act suggest that a number of foreign
investors operating in Cuba may withdraw from the island, and others who were considering
investing in Cuba are likely to change their plans. Pascal Fletcher, U.S. Embargo May Stall
Foreign Cash, FINANCIAL TIMES SURVEY OF LATIN AMERICAN FINANCE AND INVESTMENT, Mar. 25,
1996, at vi; Pascal Fletcher, Cuba Retreats Behind Hardline Policies, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1996,
at 6; Peter Morton, Canadian Firms Face Cuba Fallout: Sweeping Power of U.S. Law Puts
Corporations with Links to Havana on the Defensive, FIN. POST, Mar. 13, 1996, at 1; Elena
Cherney, Mountain of Cuban Sugar is Anathema to Amercians: Sweetening with the Enemy, THE
GAZETTE (Montreal), Mar. 16, 1996, at D1.
96 See KENICHI OHMAE, THE BORDERLESS WORLD: POWER AND STRATEGY IN THE
INTERLINKED ECONOMY 173 (1990) [hereinafter BORDERLESS WORLD].
97 Id
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discourage, rather than stimulate investment.98
Other countries, particularly those in the Pacific rim, started some
time ago to shrug off the provider mentality and opened their markets
to foreign investment. The results have been dramatic; countries like
Malaysia have become active and successful participants in the global
marketplace.99 Their experiences are living proof of the wisdom of
opening the door wide to foreign investment. Likewise, the successful
experience of Central and Eastern European countries underscores the
critical role of enabling foreign investment legislation in the rebuilding
of the economies of countries in transition.' 0
A. Fundamental Pillars of Foreign Investment Legislation
The main objective of an enabling foreign investment code is to
create a legal and regulatory regime attractive to foreign investors.'"
In order to achieve this goal, the foreign investment framework needs
to meet at least three criteria: 1) it must provide for non-discriminato-
ry, or "national," treatment of foreign investors; 2) it must grant
adequate protection to foreign investor property; and 3) it must
establish streamlined foreign investment regulations and proce-
dures. 0 2  These criteria represent the fundamental pillars of success-
ful foreign investment legislation.
98 One such country is Mexico. In 1918, the Mexican Constitution granted the federal
government direct ownership of land and waters of the Mexican territory with a right to
transfer title to private persons. Currently, the Foreign Investment Law of 1973, and the
Constitution regulate foreign investment. Under the law, foreign investment equity in
Mexican corporations could not exceed 49%. Moreover, specific activities were reserved
solely for the federal government or Mexican investors. Any exception to the 49 percent
ownership limitations were made only for special projects having the characteristics consistent
with the government's economic policies. In May 1989, Mexico enacted new regulations that
repealed all existing administrative regulations, decrees, and the Foreign Investment
Commission's general resolutions. However, the 1973 Foreign Investment Law was not
repealed. As a result of these measures, the foreign investment regime in Mexico became
less restrictive than before, but still left the door open to reverting one day to a "provider
mentality" investment climate. See Dionisio J. Kaye, Mexico Liberalizing Foreign Investmen 4
TEMP. INT'L. & COMP. LJ. 79 (1990).
99 BORDERLESS WORLD, supra note 96, at 173-81.
100 It may be argued that Cuba had no foreign investment code in place before the
Revolution and enjoyed a significant influx of foreign investment, so a foreign investment
code may not be necessary. A Cuba making its free-market transition, however, will face a
totally different domestic and international set of circumstances than those which prevailed
before 1959: the country will be impoverished and face strong competition for the attention
of foreign investors from developing countries in Latin America, Asia, and elsewhere. Like
virtually all countries making a transition from socialism to a free-market, Cuba will need an
enabling foreign investment law to foster the entry of investment under those conditions.
101 LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 9, at 155.
102 These three criteria are a distillation of the recommendations in the World Bank's
Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment. See LEGAL TREATMENT OF
FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 9, at 155-64.
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1. National Treatment of Foreign Investors
National treatment is a crucial element of a hospitable foreign
investment regime."°3 National treatment means that foreign inves-
tors should not be put at a competitive disadvantage versus domestic
investors regarding access to permits or authorizations necessary to
conduct operations in the host country.0 4 At the same time, the laws
should not give foreign investors a competitive advantage over national
investors, absent compelling circumstances. In other words, the laws
should apply fairly and equally to all investors.
2. Protection of Foreign Investors' Property
Adequate protection of investor property is also a fundamental
pillar of a favorable foreign investment climate. Such protection has
several elements. The most obvious and important one is a guarantee
against the uncompensated taking of investor property by the state. 10 5
Another type of protection that must be given to foreign investors
is the avoidance of excessive taxation and other government actions
that diminish the value of the investment. 1 6  Foreign investors
should also be free from discriminatory treatment and should receive
the same protection of their persons and property (including
intellectual property rights) as that accorded to nationals. 7
103 The right of national treatment obligates countries to treat foreigners as they would
their own nationals under their own laws. CHERYL W. GRAY, WORLD BANK DISCUSSION PAPERS
VOL. 209, EVOLVING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AND
EASTERN EUROPE 8 (July 1993) [hereinafter EVOLVING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS]. This principle
assumes, of course, that the country's own citizens are able to participate fully in economic
activities, including investment. As will be discussed below, such is not the case in Cuba
today.
104 LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 9, at 158, 204.
105 The taking may not be outright but take the form of "creeping expropriation," which
refers to measures that have the effect of impairing the economic viability of the enterprise;
for example, interfering with investor access to needed facilities and supplies; denying the
investor access to funds or profits; coercing the investor to sell the enterprise at unfairly low
rates; and, in the most extreme cases, forcing the investor to leave the country and deprive
it of effective control of the enterprise. SWAN & MURPHY, supra note 26, at 785-87.
106 As noted earlier, shortly after the Castro government came to power, it seized most
business enterprises and other private property on the island. Some of the takings came in
the form of outright expropriations, while others proceeded indirectly via taxation and
onerous administrative requirements placed on industries such as oil and mining. The
regime also imposed such severe restrictions on the export of foreign currency that they
effectively prevented any payment from being made to creditors outside the country. See
Delissa A. Ridgeway, V'ewing the Future Through the Rear View Mirror: An Historical Perspective on
U.S. Expropriation Claims Against Cuba, in SHAW, PITrMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE'S WORKSHOP
ON PROPERTY CLAIMS IN CUBA'S TRANSITION 1, 2 (Jan. 26, 1995), available in Shaw, Pittman,
Potts & Trowbridge's Library, Washington, D.C.
107 LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 9, at 204.
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3. Streamlined Foreign Investment Regulations and Procedures
The third fundamental pillar of a favorable foreign investment
regime is a regulatory process free from bureaucratic impediments to
investment. The concept of "one-stop shopping" has been postulated
as the ideal method for streamlining foreign investment regula-
tions."' Under this concept, there is a central office where foreign
investors can register and satisfy all other requirements to set up their
enterprises.10 9 The obvious benefits of such a central office are time
and transaction costs savings for foreign investors. Other advantages
of the central office concept are the reduction of administrative costs,
the elimination of duplicative government structures, and the
minimization of conflicting requirements and interpretations of
existing laws."' An indirect, but perhaps important advantage of the
establishment of a central agency to deal with foreign investors is that
it gives the investors the certainty of having a single contact with whom
to deal, and from which to obtain advice and help in resolving
problems as they arise.
B. Specific Objectives of Foreign Investment Laws in Countries in
Transition
In addition to the fundamental pillars on which successful foreign
investment regimes rest, conditions in countries making a transition
from socialism to a free-market society warrant that additional
objectives be fostered by the foreign investment codes and related
legislation. This section discusses four such objectives. The continued
relevance of these specific objectives depends, of course, on the
conditions that exist in a country as the transition unfolds.
1. Promotion of Rapid Investment in the Country's Infrastructure
After years of communist rule, important elements of the
infrastructure of former socialist countries are typically in a state of
disrepair.' In Cuba, early foreign investment will be required to
rebuild, enhance and modernize critical areas of the infrastructure,
such as energy production, telecommunications, and transporta-
tion. 1 2 These sectors of the economy are not only crucial to the
welfare of the population, but their upgrading is required to attract
foreign investment. Given the importance of rapidly modernizing
108 LOUIS T. WELLS, JR. & ALVIN G. WINT, FACILITATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT:
GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS TO SCREEN, MONITOR, AND SERVICE INVESTMENT FROM ABROAD 1-3
(1991) [hereinafter FACILITATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT].
109 Id at 1.
110 Id
III Project Finance: In the CIS Slow Lane, THE BANKER, Jan. 1995.
112 PREEG & LEVINE, supra note 7, at 39.
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Cuba's infrastructure, foreign investment legislation should not unduly
burden investments in this area but, to the contrary, encourage the
participation of foreign investors in these strategic sectors.
2. Promoting the Transfer of Modern Technology
Recent experience in Central and Eastern European countries in
transition suggests that foreign investment has helped reduce the gap
between the state of technological development in those countries and
conditions in the rest of the industrialized world."' Foreign investors
have consistently installed the latest (or near-latest) technologies in
their facilities in Central and Eastern Europe."4 Foreign investment
legislation, therefore, should foster investments that will introduce
state-of-the-art technologies during the transition period and should
provide adequate protection of foreign investor technology to
encourage its importation into the country. Such protection should be
afforded by the foreign investment code and other laws, particularly
the intellectual property laws.
3. Fostering Employment-Creating Enterprises
An important objective of foreign investment legislation in
countries in transition is to encourage the creation of new sources of
employment for the population during the transition to a market
economy. There are two reasons for this importance.
First, one of the effects of the transition process is a rise in
unemployment as inefficient state enterprises shut down and the
government bureaucracy is culled."5  The experience in many
Central and Eastern European countries-and some Latin American
countries-implementing radical economic reform packages is that the
rise in unemployment leads to social instability and popular backlash
against the economic reform process." 6 To minimize these phenom-
ena, foreign investment in employment-creating enterprises should be
113 DOBOSIEWICZ, supra note 78, at 29.
114 Id
11s This process is already at work in Cuba. Along with universal health care, education,
and housing, guaranteed employment is regarded as one of the achievements of the Cuban
Revolution. But in an effort to make Cuba's economy more efficient, the Cuban Government
is rescinding the guarantee of lifetime employment. In a May 1995 interview, Pedro Ross
Leal, secretary general of the Cuban Workers' Union, described the process as one of
"rationalization of employment" that is producing a contingent of "available workers" who
have agreed to be "voluntarily relocated." As many as 800,000 people are expected to be
eventually "rationalized" by the new policy, when fully implemented. In Radical Move, Cuba
Ends Guaranteed Jobs, CHICAGOLAND, May 14, 1995, at Cll.
116 Reforms towards a market economy also result in lowering the standard of living for
the average working person. Marek Wierzbowski, Foreign Investment in Eastern Europe, 4
TRANSNAT'L LAw 623, 629 (1991). For example, while Poland was going through the initial
stages of the economic transition process, there was a thirty percent decrease in the standard
of living of the population. Id. at 637.
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encouraged as a way to promote social stability and ensure the orderly
implementation of economic reforms.
Second, employment in foreign-owned enterprises exposes the
domestic labor force to modern work practices that improve productivi-
ty."7 Typically, most workers of countries in transition lack the skills
and discipline necessary to improve productivity and compete in the
global marketplace."' In addition, those countries suffer from an
acute shortage of qualified management personnel during the
transition to a market economy. 9 Foreign investors in Central and
Eastern Europe have introduced market-tested management skills that
have trickled down to indigenous enterprises.
20
4. Improving the Balance of Payments
Countries in transition in Central and Eastern Europe have relied
on foreign investment to increase exports and thus improve their
balance of payments.' Indeed, an important objective of the
foreign investment regime of a country in transition should be to
encourage investment in export-oriented enterprises.
IV. Recommended Elements of a Cuban Foreign Investment Code
The concepts discussed in the previous section can be applied to
determine the type of foreign investment code that would be most
beneficial to Cuba during its free-market transition. Two important
observations need to be made at the outset. First, the experience in
Central and Eastern European countries shows that it is very difficult
if not impossible to develop a suitable foreign investment code in a
single try.1 22 Several attempts are often necessary, either because the
starting point of the effort is an inadequate code which must be
molded in incremental steps into a workable piece of legislation or
because the contents of the legislation are driven by political and
economic conditions that are in a state of flux. 2'
Second, if a choice is to be made between speed and perfection,
speed should prevail. There will be a great need in Cuba for foreign
investment legislation that meets the requirements of both the country
and the investors. Under those circumstances, it will be preferable to
have adequate but perhaps less than perfect legislation enacted early
than to hold up passage while seeking to refine the formulation.
A third observation follows from these two. The first foreign
117 See DOBOSIEWICZ, supra note 78, at 28.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 32.
122 Id. at 38-39.
123 Id.
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investment code that is enacted during Cuba's transition should be
kept as simple as possible in an effort to shorten the drafting period,
minimize debates among the decision-makers, and avoid causing strain
in the transition period government structures, which may not be
capable of administering overly complex statutes.
For these reasons, the substantive provisions discussed below may
not all be capable of early implementation. The highest priority
provisions, and consequently those that must be included from the
start in the Cuban foreign investment code, are those granting national
treatment to foreign investors and allowing 100% foreign ownership of
Cuban enterprises; those guaranteeing full compensation in the event
of expropriation; those removing restrictions on profit repatriation;
and those streamlining the regulation of foreign-owned enterprises.
A. Provisions to Implement the Fundamental Pillars of Foreign
Investment Legislation
Foreign investors considering going into Cuba during its transition
must be reassured that no burdensome limitations, conditions, or
impediments will be placed on their ability to operate in the coun-
try;"' that their investment will be protected against adverse actions
by the state; and that they will be able to repatriate profits and move
capital in and out of the country without restrictions. In short, the
investment climate must be fair and favorable to the investor. This
section discusses the main foreign investment code provisions that will
create such an investment climate in Cuba.
1. Guaranteeing National Treatment
Equal treatment of foreign investors in Cuba could be guaranteed
through express declarations in the Foreign Investment Code (and
perhaps the Constitution) that foreign investors enjoy the equal
protection of Cuba's laws and are subject to the same treatment
afforded domestic individuals and enterprises. To the extent that any
distinctions need to be made between foreign and domestic business
entities, such distinctions should be clearly defined and should be
identified in the Foreign Investment Code or cross-referenced there to
other applicable legislation.
124 For example, the transition period 1991 Polish Law on Foreign Investment has
eliminated most restrictions on foreign investment. In all but a very few cases, foreign
investment does not require any special permits, and there is no upper or lower limit on the
amount to be invested. There is also no limit on the repatriation of profits abroad. Marek
Kaszubski, Overview of the Law Governing Foreign Investment in Poland, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF
TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE 1990 328-31 (PLI
Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 549, 1990). The drafters of the
new law believe that the Polish economy requires at least $10 billion of foreign investment.
Wierzbowski, supra note 116, at 643.
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For domestic political reasons, it is also important to avoid
creating the impression that foreign investors are being given
advantages over the country's nationals. 25 This is crucial in Cuba,
where growing resentment exists over special treatment accorded to
foreigners by the current Cuban Government. 2 6 Continued special
treatment for foreign investors may be poorly received by the Cuban
people and may serve as political ammunition for those opposed to
economic reforms. 2
7
2. Eliminating Restrictions on Property Ownership by Foreign
Investors
Restrictions on foreign equity participation in domestic enterprises
are designed to ensure direct or indirect state control over the
enterprises, particularly in socialist countries. 128 In free-market
countries, these restrictions (typically in the form of mandatory
percentages of local equity participation in foreign-owned enterprises)
are most often imposed in "strategic" national industries such as
utilities or telecommunications companies129
125 It may, however, be deemed in the country's interest to provide special incentives to
investment in areas of importance to the country's development, such as infrastructure
projects. Such incentives should be available to all investors even if, initially, only foreign
investors have the capital and technical resources to take advantage of the incentives.
126 Since the legalization of the use of the dollar and dollar-based enterprises in 1993,
Cuba has seen a growing division of its society into classes based not in the traditional Marxist
principles, but on one's access to the dollars brought in by foreign investors and visitors.
Such class distinctions have led to a growing feeling of animosity towards foreigners as well
as against Cuban employees of the joint venture industries. Mark Cooper. Letters From
Havana-For Sale: Used Marxism. Castro's Grandchildren Discover the Glory of the Dollar, HARPER'S
MAG., Mar. 1995, at 56, 64.
127 Venezuela serves as a good example of the problems that arise when politicians
capitalize on the popular backlash against liberal economic reforms. Rafael Caldera came
to power with the votes of Venezuelans hurt by a drastic, yet necessary, economic reform
program implemented by his predecessor. President Caldera instituted a series of measures,
such as foreign exchange and prices controls, aimed at easing the pain resulting in part from
the economic reform program. These measures, however, exacerbated, rather than
alleviated, the country's economic crisis, scaring away foreign investment. See U.S. FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION, Venezuela Briefing Note, Feb. 1995, on file at Shaw, Pittman, Potts &
Trowbridge, Washington, D.C.
128 M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 104-07 (1994)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT].
129 See Mark B. Baker & Mark D. Holmes, An Analysis of Latin American Foreign Investment
Law: Proposals for Striking a Balance Between Foreign Investment and Political Stability, 23 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REv. 1, 14-17 (1991). The authors advance the argument that restrictions on
foreign equity participation in important national industries reduces expropriation risk. They
argue that, for example, Mexico's sale of its telecommunications company to foreign investors
could be subsequently undone by a nationalistic government which opposes privatization.
The authors suggest that the host country retain ownership of important national industries
to prevent changes in policy from damaging the country's reputation with prospective foreign
investors. Id. at 32-34. On the other hand, equity restrictions have been criticized for
creating "an elite group of local businesses who form associations with foreign capital and
enable governments that are favourable to their business interests to remain in power."
INTERNATIONAL LAw OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 128, at 111-12.
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These types of restrictions have been prevalent in Cuba. As noted
earlier, under Law 50 majority participation by local enterprises was a
requirement, or at least a practice followed in most instances. 130
Under Law 77, it would be possible for a foreign investor to be sole
owner of its enterprise. However, it will be interesting to see whether
such investments will actually be permitted, particularly in sensitive
areas of the economy.
All equity participation restrictions should be abolished in Cuba's
foreign investment legislation because they generally deter foreign
investment.13 1 Under the principle of national treatment, foreign
investors should be able to use the same forms of business organization
available to nationals, without additional equity participation restric-
tions. 132
The experience of countries in transition in Central and Eastern
Europe, which now allow 100% foreign ownership of domestic
enterprises, supports the wisdom of removing restrictions on equity
participation. 33  Several countries, in Latin America, including
Mexico and Venezuela, have also eliminated or relaxed restrictions on
foreign equity participation, although significant restrictions remain in
place in some countries.!34
130 Initially, under Law 50, the Cuban government restricted investment to certain areas
of the economy such as oil extraction and tourism. As the economy worsened, the
government opened additional sectors. See Minister Interviewed on Foreign Investment in Sugar,
supra note 38; CuBA IN TRANSITION, supra note 19, at 33.
131 OECD ON FDI, supra note 73, at 58.
132 I.
135 EVOLVING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS, supra note 103, at 8. For example, Hungary, the
Eastern European country that has attracted the largest amount of foreign investment, has
succeeded by establishing liberal investment legislation that permits 100% foreign ownership
of investment. Id. at 79. To date Hungary has attracted $8.5 billion in foreign direct
investment, as much as the rest of Central and Eastern Europe combined. WHITE HOUSE
CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, HUNGARY, (Jan.
12-13, 1995) (no page citation available) (on file with authors). Most Central and Eastern
European countries, however, prohibit foreigners from owning real property. Foreign
investors can circumvent these prohibitions by purchasing real estate through a 100%
foreign owned domestic enterprise. The Czech Republic, for example, permits 100% foreign-
owned Czech enterprises to own real estate. Id; EVOLVING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS, supra note
103, at 55.
The extent of allowable real estate ownership by foreigners will undoubtedly be a thorny
issue in Cuba's market transition. Before the Revolution, foreign ownership of significant
portions of agriculture and commercial land was a source of popular discontent. The
revolutionary leaders used the popular discontent as justification for the expropriation of
foreign assets in Cuba. Nelson R. Amaro, Mass and Class in the Origins of the Cuban Revolution,
in CUBAN COMMUNISM 1959-1995 39, 47 (Irving L. Horowitz, ed. 1995). Because of this
experience, a transition government in Cuba may feel compelled to impose restrictions on
the ownership of real estate by foreigners. If such restrictions are imposed, provisions like
those currently in place in the Czech Republic might be an effective way to allow foreign
investment in real property while minimizing popular concerns.
134 Baker & Holmes, supra note 129, at 14-17.
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3. Protection Against Uncompensated Expropriation of Property
a. Domestic Law Protections
Considering Cuba's history of private property takings, providing
strong guarantees against uncompensated expropriation must be an
essential element of its foreign investment legislation."' Guarantees
against uncompensated expropriation should be incorporated into the
country's Constitution and restated in the Foreign Investment
Code."36
As important perhaps as giving express guarantees against
uncompensated expropriation is setting forth a proper standard for
compensation in the event of expropriation. The internationally-
recognized standard is the formulation coined in 1938 by U.S.
Secretary of State Cordel Hull: "prompt, adequate and effective
compensation." 13' The World Bank Guidelines incorporate this
135 Cuba's new Law 77 does include express guarantees against expropriation. See supra
note 51 and accompanying text. However, the effectiveness of the mechanisms defined in
the law for giving effect to these guarantees would have to be tested in practice.
136 See Matias F. Travieso-Diaz & Steven R. Escobar, Cuba's Transition to a Free-Market
Democracy: A Survey of Required Changes to Laws and Legal Institutions, 5 DuKEJ. COMP. & INT'L
L. 379, 410 (1995) [hereinafter Travieso-Diaz & Escobar on Cuba's Transition]. It is
important to understand, however, that guarantees against expropriation written into the laws
of a country do not necessarily bind a successor government if it chooses to abrogate the laws
providing the guarantees. INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 101, at
96. The laws, however, may be enforceable against the country in international fora when
resolving investment disputes. Id. at 96-98. They also serve an important signaling function
in that they indicate to foreigners that past practices against foreign investors are no longer
pursued. Id at 95.
137 A shorthand sometimes used for the Hull formula is that of "just compensation,"
meaning "in the absence of exceptional circumstances ., an amount equivalent to the value
of the property taken ... paid at the time of the taking ... and in a form economically
usable by the foreign national." Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past?
Modern Tribunals and the International Law ofExpropriation, 85A.J.I.L. 474,476 (1991) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712 (1987)).
Developing countries have attacked the Hull formula, which was perceived as an
encroachment on their sovereignty by developed countries. This challenge was manifested
in Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, U.N. GA. Res. 1803, at XVII, which called for
"appropriate" compensation under both national and international law. Developing countries
continued their attack through Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, U.N. GA Res.
No. 3281, at XXIX (the Charter). The Charter states that compensation controversies are
to be settled under the law of the expropriating state, implying the ability of a state to pay
less than full compensation for expropriated property. See, SwAN & MURPHY, supra note 26,
at 775-76.
Resolution No. 1803's "appropriate" compensation standard, however, is arguably
analogous to the Hull formula. Haliburton Fales, A Comparison of Compensation for
Nationalization of Alien Property with Standards of Compensation Under United States Law, 5 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 871, 880-82 (Winter 1983-84). The Hull formula, therefore, remains for all
practical purposes the internationally-recognized standard. In addition, the need to
encourage foreign investment in developing countries has eroded the support that once
existed for limited compensation formulations such as that implied in the Charter. Norton,
supra, at 475.
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standard.' Under current practice, the "prompt" element of the
Hull formula means payment without delay.'3 9 The "adequate"
element means that the payment should reflect the "fair market value"
or "value as a going concern" of the expropriated property."4 The
"effective" element is satisfied when the payment is made in the
currency brought in by the investor, in a convertible currency (as
designated by the International Monetary Fund), or in any other
currency acceptable to the investor. 4 '
b. Use of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)
Bilateral investment treaties protect investors from a signatory
country providing a framework in the host country for national
treatment of such investors and setting up dispute settlement proce-
dures, methods for compensation for expropriation, and guarantees of
the convertibility and repatriation of profits.14 Given the increasing
use of BITs-particularly by the United States-Cuban foreign
investment legislation should authorize and call for the conclusion of
such agreements. 41
c. Multilateral Dispute Resolution Agreements
The International Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID
Convention) is a multilateral agreement intended to reduce foreign
investor concerns by helping resolve investment disputes of private
parties with foreign states; as such, it is particularly useful in countries
in transition. 4' Accession to the ICSID Convention allows a signato-
ry state and a national of another signatory state to submit their
138 LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 9, at 161-62.
139 Id. at 163.
140 SwAN & MURPHY, supra note 26, at 774-75; see also LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN
INVESTMENT, supra note 9, at 161-62. "Compensation will be deemed 'adequate' if it is based
on the fair market value of the taken asset as such value is determined immediately before
the time at which the taking occurred or the decision to take the asset became publicly
known." Id. Fair market value can be defined as the "amount that a willing buyer would
normally pay to a willing seller after taking into account the nature of the investment, the
circumstances in which it would operate in the future and its specific characteristics,
including the period in which it has been in existence, the proportion of tangible assets in
the total investment and other relevant factors." Id.
141 LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 9, at 163.
142 SwAN & MURPHY, supra note 26, at 717. For a detailed discussion of BITs and their
use to promote foreign investment, seeJose Luis Siqueiros, Bilateral Treaties on the Reciprocal
Protection of Foreign Investment 24 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 255 (1994).
143 SWAN & MURPHY, supra note 26, at 717. As noted earlier, Cuba has recently entered
into BITs with several countries. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. The trend
towards signing BITs should continue during Cuba's transition and be extended to include
the United States and all other important potential trading partners.
144 Kenneth S.Jacob, Reinvigorating ICSID With a New Mission and With Renewed Respect for
Party Autonomy, 33 VA.J. INT'L. L. 123, 135-38 (1992).
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investment disputes to arbitration by the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).4 5 The Convention also
establishes an Additional Facility for the Administration of Conciliation,
Arbitration and Fact-Finding Proceedings, which is a mechanism for
settling certain disputes outside ICSID's jurisdiction under the ICSID
Convention. 146 '
Cuba should become a party to the ICSID Convention so that, if
Cuban government agencies or instrumentalities continue to enter into
joint ventures with foreign investors, the joint venture agreements can
refer contractual disputes to ICSID arbitration. Cuba's participation
in the ICSID would provide further assurance to foreign investors that
the country is prepared to honor its commitments to them and treat
them fairly.
d. Investment Insurance: OPIC, MIGA, and Private
Insurers
As an additional incentive for foreign investment, the Cuban
government should assist foreign investors obtaining Overseas Private
Investment Corporation ("OPIC") or Multilateral Investment Guaran-
tee Agency ("MIGA") coverage. OPIC is a corporation owned by the
United States government which offers political risk insurance to U.S.
businesses which invest in foreign countries.'47 OPIC also offers
insurance against inconvertibility, that is, "the inability of an investor
to convert into dollars the local currency received as profits, earnings
or return of an original investment."'48 In order for U.S. investors
to become eligible for OPIC coverage, the host country (Cuba, in this
case) needs to enter into an agreement with the United States which
enables the U.S. government to authorize OPIC coverage for qualifying
investments in Cuba.1
4 9
MIGA is an investment guarantee agency operated under the
auspices of the World Bank. 5 MIGA offers guarantees and reinsur-
ance to eligible investments against losses resulting from four
145 Id. at 126-27.
146 Id. at 126.
147 RicHARD C. ALLISON &JACKJ. COEJR., PROTECTING AGAINST THE EXPROPRIATION RISK
IN INVESTING ABROAD § 3.01 (1993) [hereinafter PROTECTING AGAINST EXPROPRIATION RISK].
148 Id. at § 3.02(1)(a).
149 SwAN & MuRPHY, supra note 26, at 810.
The most fundamental provision of this agreement is the host government's [i.e.
Cuba's] acceptance of OPIC's claim to subrogation-the right in OPIC to
compensation from the host government for the funds it has had to pay to the
investor. This agreement also characteristically requires that the U.S. investor obtain
the approval of the foreign government before OPIC will issue a guarantee.
Arbitration is often required in the event of a dispute between OPIC and the host
country over the agency's right to receive compensation as subrogee.
Id at 810-11.
150 Id. at 815.
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categories of non-commercial risks: 1) the transfer risk resulting from
host government restrictions on currency conversion and transfers;
2) the risk of loss resulting from legislative or administrative actions or
omissions of the host government which deprive the foreign investor
of ownership or control of substantial elements of his investment;
3) the repudiation or breach of government contracts in cases where
the investor has no access to a competent dispute resolution forum, or
faces unreasonable delays in such a forum, or is unable to enforce a
decision issued in his favor; and 4) the risk of armed conflict and civil
disturbance.'5 ' MIGA will not issue a guarantee to an investor
without the host government's approval of the guarantee. 5 2 Cuba's
laws should therefore provide for the expedited approval of MIGA
guarantees.
Apart from any Cuban government undertakings to assist foreign
investors to secure investment guarantees, the investors may also take
steps to purchase private investment insurance. Insurance from private
companies, such as Lloyd's of London, offers several advantages over
OPIC or MIGA investment insurance. 5 ' Private insurers frequently
cover existing projects, while OPIC only covers "new" projects.'54
Private insurers may also cover a wider range of contingencies, resolve
claims more quickly, and indemnify a greater amount of loss than
OPIC or MIGA.'55
While obtaining private insurance is the responsibility of the
foreign investor, Cuba should avoid adopting laws or regulations that
impair the activities of investment insurers. The Cuban government
should also cooperate with insurers seeking to settle claims filed by
investors under their policies.
4. Guarantees of Currency Convertibility and Profit Repatriation
Rights
Free convertibility of currency and unrestricted ability to repatriate
profits are aspects of a foreign investment regime that are particularly
important to investors. 156 Most Central and Eastern European
countries have removed restrictions on profit repatriation from their
foreign investment regimes.'57 The World Bank Guidelines also
151 Id. at 815-16.
152 Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, 20 INT'L LAW. 485,
491 (1986) (quoting art. 15 of the MIGA Convention).
153 PROTECTING AGAINST EXPROPRIATION RISK, supra note 147, at § 3.03 (quoting art. 15
of the MIGA Convention).
154 Id. at § 3.03[1].
155 Id. All these advantages, however, come at a price. Private insurers generally offer
shorter coverage terms and command significantly higher premiums than OPIC or MICA.
Id.
156 See LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 9, at 20.
157 EVOLVING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS, supra note 103, at 8.
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emphasize the importance of unrestricted repatriation of profits to
foreign investors. 5 Cuba provides such rights to investors under the
new foreign investment law. 5 These benefits should be retained in
the transition period legislation.
The scope of any future controls that might be imposed on the
convertibility of currency held by foreign investors would depend on
the Cuban government's macro-economic policies during the transition
to a free-market economy. In the interest of fostering foreign
investment, however, Cuba should refrain from imposing restrictions
on the repatriation of after-tax profits by foreign investors.
5. Reduction in Pre-Approval Requirements
Government pre-approval requirements often pose a significant
hurdle to foreign investment. Most Central and Eastern European
countries have abolished pre-approval requirements and have
simplified the procedures necessary to set up an enterprise.160 Many
Latin American countries have also streamlined entry procedures in an
effort to facilitate foreign investment.16' The Cuban government
should follow these examples and abolish or minimize pre-approval
requirements for foreign investors.
Special attention should be paid to the manner in which any
required pre-approvals are processed. Cuba's foreign investment
legislation should establish a single government agency or institution
with pre-approval authority over all foreign investment.'62 Worldwide
experience suggests, however, that concentrating pre-approval authority
in one government institution leads to problems in the issuance of
post-approval licenses and permits to the foreign investor by other
government agencies, which often seek to reassert their authority after
the pre-approval process.16  Future Cuban foreign investment
legislation, therefore, should include provisions for the automatic
issuance of certain authorizations or permits upon approval of the
158 LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 9, at 159-60. The World Bank
Guidelines prescribe free repatriation of profits, salaries of foreign personnel, and any
amounts used for the repayment of debts. Id.
159 Law 77, supra note 38, art. 8.
160 EVOLVING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS, supra note 103.
161 Baker & Holmes, supra note 129, at 21-25. Mexico, for example, no longer requires
government approval for investment in a newly-formed Mexican enterprise if the investment
does not exceed $100 million and meets other criteria. Chile has a "fast-track" approval
procedure that allows the Executive Secretary of the Foreign Investment Committee and the
Minister of the Economy to approve investments of less than $5 million. Colombian law
requires approval of investments conforming to government criteria within four weeks. If the
documentation is not complete by the end of the four week period, the government issues
a temporary permit for twelve weeks until the documentation is completed and the approval
process resumes. Id.
162 See FACILITATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 108, at 26.
163 Id.
1996]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
investor and prohibitions against lengthy evaluations of projects by
institutions that control licenses and permits."
Also important are the procedures used to evaluate and approve
proposed investments. Project-by-project screening is probably the
most cumbersome form of evaluation and the one most likely to
hinder foreign investment. Given the importance of stimulating
the rapid entry of foreign capital into Cuba, project-by-project
evaluations should be abandoned. Instead, a well-defined list of
requirements for investment should be set, and if sectors of the
economy are to be declared off-limits to foreign investors, those should
be clearly identified in the legislation so the identification may serve
as a sufficient screen. 66 From the standpoint of a potential investor,
a "negative list" describing restricted sectors would be preferable to a
"positive list" of sectors open to foreign investment.'67
6. One-Stop Shopping
Cuba's Foreign Investment Code should establish a central office
before which foreign investors can satisfy all requirements for setting
up their enterprises. As noted above, the benefits of a centralized
approval system include savings in time and transaction costs for
foreign investors and the elimination of investment disincentives, such
as duplicative regulations and multiple regulatory entities.
The one stop-shopping concept should also be applied to unifying
the foreign investment regulations. Placing all the regulations
affecting foreign investment in a single code (or cross-referencing all
the regulations affecting foreign investment) would eliminate
duplicative or inconsistent regulatory actions. The Foreign Investment
Code should also include a residual clause stating that, to the extent
not covered by its specific provisions, a foreign investor has the same
rights, and is subject to the same rules and regulations, as a domestic
person or entity.
A useful tool to foreign investors would be a regularly-updated
handbook published by the Cuban Government would contain
information about legislation, regulations and procedures relevant to
16 Id. at 28-29.
165 As noted earlier, every foreign investment venture in Cuba must undergo a
protracted approval process that includes personal signoff by Fidel Castro himself.
166 FACILITATING FOREIGN INVEsTMENT, supra note 108, at 41.
167 Louis T. Wells, Jr., Mobile Exporters: New Foreign Investors in East Asia, in FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT 173, 189 (Kenneth A. Froot ed., 1993) [hereinafter MOBILE EXPORTERS].
In the 1980s, the government of Indonesia shifted from a rather unclear "positive list" of
sectors in which foreign investment would be allowed, to a short and clear "negative list" of
sectors in which foreign investment would not be allowed. Thus, a would-be investor could
tell with a fair degree of certainty whether a proposal would be accepted or not. The
increased certainty provided by this method was found beneficial by investors, particularly
small firms. Id see also LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 9, at 157.
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foreign investment.'68 The central office handling foreign investor
applications and inquiries should be charged with the task of publish-
ing the handbook and distributing it to prospective investors.
B. Foreign Investment Code Provisions to Meet Specific Economic or
Political Objectives
The provisions discussed in this subsection favor foreign invest-
ment in particular sectors of the economy by giving investors in those
sectors monetary advantages in the form of reduced taxes or tariffs.
These types of provisions, however, are controversial and their success
in stimulating foreign investment is far from proven. They merit
examination, nonetheless, because they are tools available to lawmakers
to channel foreign investment into areas where it is most urgently
needed.
1. Special Tax Preferences
Special tax preferences, which are a form of subsidy, remain the
most common incentive offered to foreign investors. 69 Tax incentives
are often used as a form of "signaling," to denote a country's desire to
attract foreign investment in a given sector or across the board.17 °
Many commentators have noted that special tax incentives,
standing alone, do not appear to attract foreign investment.' The
World Bank Guidelines recommend against special tax incentives for
foreign investors. 172 Most of the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe have rescinded their special tax incentives for foreign investors
after having them in place for a few years, and now treat foreign and
domestic investors on equal terms. 171 Indonesia also abolished its
special tax incentives in 1985, and the subsequent large inflows of
foreign capital into that country suggest that the special tax incentives
were not essential to attract foreign investment.
174
168 LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 9, at 158-59.
169 INVESTMENT INCENTIVE AND DISINCENTIVES: EFFECTS ON INTERNATIONAL DIRECT
INVESTMENT ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 16 (1989).
170 JOHN M. KLINE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT STRATEGIES IN RESTRUCTURING ECONOMIES:
LEARNING FROM CORPORATE EXPERIENCES IN CHILE 245 (1992) (describing Chile's guaranteed
tax rate for foreign investments as a strong signal that foreign investors were welcome in the
country).
171 See, e.g., Yitzhak Hadari, The Role of Tax Incentives in Attracting Foreign Investments in
Selected Developing Countries and the Desirable Policy, 24 INT'L LAW. 121, 123 (1990); Kojo
Yelpaala, In Search of Effective Policies for Foreign Direct Investment: Alternatives to Tax Incentive
Policies, 7 Nw.J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 208, 212 (1985). Special tax incentives have been criticized
for discriminating against domestic investment, complicating tax administration, and
substantially reducing revenue. EVOLVING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS, supra note 103, at 8.
172 LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 9, at 160-61.
173 Frances Williams, Eastern Europe Varies Widely on Incentives-Foreign Investors are Offered
Fewer Perks, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1994, at 6.
174 MOBILE EXPORTERS, supra note 167, at 184.
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The experiences of countries which have abolished special tax
incentives suggest that such incentives should not be included in
Cuba's foreign investment legislation, except possibly for investment in
infrastructure, high technology, and other areas deemed crucial to the
economy in the early stages of the transition. Any tax incentives given
should be of only limited duration (three to five years).
2. Tariff Reductions
In general, the use of tariffs in Cuba will probably be governed by
the rules of the World Trade Organization's General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT]), and those of regional trade agreements
that Cuba mayjoin. Beyond those, Cuba's use of tariff reductions to
foster foreign investment also hinges on the transition government's
overall economic and development policies.
Cuba could, for example, decide to eliminate tariffs altogether, in
line with certain economic arguments sometimes made against the use
of tariffs in developing countries."' The elimination of tariffs may
attract foreign investment, particularly in the manufacturing sector,
since the entire country would, in essence, become an export-
processing zone. The loss of tax revenues from the elimination of
tariffs could be offset by additional foreign investment and the
consequent expansion of the tax base. Repealing tariffs would also
eliminate the often time-consuming collection procedures and allow
disbanding the entities charged with tariff collection.
3. Export-Processing Zones
If Cuba eliminates import and export tariffs and makes very
limited use of tax incentives to foreign investment, the establishment
of export-processing zones (EPZs) will not provide a significant further
175 The two main arguments for tariffs, in addition to revenue generation, are the
"optimum tariff theory" and "import-substitution policies." PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE
OBSTELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMics 205, 217, 237 (2D ED. 1991). The optimum tariff
theory posits that there is a tariff rate which optimizes national welfare by improving the
country's terms of trade to the point where these improvements exceed the costs of
production and consumption distortions. Id. at 217. Terms of trade gains from tariffs,
however, depend on the tariff-imposing country's ability to drive down foreign export prices.
Id. at 237. Small countries such as Cuba, which cannot affect world prices, do not receive any
terms of trade gains from tariffs, thus the tariff actually reduces national welfare.
Import substitution is a policy of encouraging the growth of domestic industry by limiting
imports of manufactured goods, primarily through tariffs. Id. at 243. Import substitution,
however, necessarily limits export growth, since protected import-substituting industries draw
resources away from actual or potential export sectors. Id. at 245. Import substitution will
not help develop a competitive manufacturing sector if there are fundamental reasons, such
as lack of skilled labor or resources, why the country lacks a competitive advantage in
manufacturing. Id. In addition, import-substitution policies may cause the widening of wage
differentials between manufacturing and agricultural workers, which results in high migration
rates to urban centers and unemployment. Id. at 250-52.
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boost to foreign investment. If tariffs are retained, on the other hand,
EPZs may provide some investment incentives and may be used to
encourage investment in coastal areas which would otherwise see little
investment in areas such as manufacturing.'7 6
The success of EPZs in Cuba may depend to a great extent on the
macro-economic policies adopted by the Cuban government. If the
Cuban government imposes controls on the convertibility of foreign
exchange, the establishment of EPZs offering unrestricted convertibility
of foreign exchange and repatriation of profits may attract foreign
investment to the EPZs in the manufacturing of products for ex-
port. "'77 Special tax incentives may also attract foreign investors to
EPZs, although some data suggests otherwise. 7
4. Trade-Related Investment Performance Requirements
Trade-Related Investment Performance Requirements (TRIPs) are,
in essence, host government policies which guide foreign-owned firms
into engaging in a particular type of activity. 79  The two most
common forms of TRIPs are export quotas and local content require-
ments. 80
Export quotas and local content requirements do not appear to
discourage foreign investment in many cases when other factors, such
as attractive locations, protected markets, or other incentives offset the
costs of the requirements.' 8' On the other hand, the World Bank
Guidelines assert that the imposition of TRIPs deters foreign invest-
ment and report that they are becoming rare.'8 2 Since Cuba proba-
bly will not have the resources to adequately, implement and monitor
a TRIPs program, TRIPs should not be included in Cuba's foreign
investment legislation.
176 The ease and reliability of transportation to the primary export market, however, has
been cited as a major factor influencing the investment decision, so the location of the EPZ
seem critical. POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF NAFTA ON CBI, supra note 75, at 46. A survey of firms
which have invested in apparel assembly enterprises in countries which received unilateral
trade concessions from the United States under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act
(CBERA) reports that political stability was cited most often as an important determinant of
the investment decision. Another important factor cited as influencing the decision to invest
in CBERA-beneficiary countries is the lack of controls on exchange rates. Id. at 43, 46.
177 See THE WORLD BANK, EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES 16 (1992) [hereinafter EXPORT
PROCESSING ZONES].
178 For example, host government measures to encourage foreign investment such as
special tax incentives, are said not to be significant factors influencing the investment
decisions of apparel firms doing business in the Caribbean Basin area. POTENTIAL EFFECTS
OF NAFTA ON CBI, supra note 75, at 43.
179 See generally THEODORE H. MORAN & CHARLES S. PEARSON, Do TRIPs Trip Up Foreign
Investment? An International Business Diplomacy Perspective, in FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN
THE 1990s: A NEW CLIMATE IN THE THIRD WORLD 28, 30 (1990).
180 Id. at 30.
181 OECD on FDI, supra note 73, at 58.
182 LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 9, at 202.
1996]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
In addition, the United States views export controls as violating
standards of free-trade and creating trade distortions." 3 The United
States also contends that export controls violate the GATT, although
a GATT panel upheld the validity of specific export targets in the
Canadian Foreign Investment Review Act of 1982.184 Given that the
United States will most likely become Cuba's most important source of
foreign investment during a market transition, it is critical that Cuban
decision-makers not impose requirements in this area that run counter
to U.S. positions, barring extraordinary circumstances.
V. Relationship Between Foreign Investment Legislation and
Other Transition Laws
Foreign investment in a country in transition does not occur in a
vacuum but, rather, operates within a legal framework that reflects the
country's stage of development and the political and economic
circumstances of the transition. This section explores briefly several
areas of the law that are not specifically related to foreign investment
but which may impact on a foreign investor's ability to operate in the
country or otherwise affect his decision whether to invest.
The discussion that follows must by necessity be abbreviated and
is not intended to examine all the issues that are raised in each area
of the law.
A. Laws that May Encourage Foreign Investment
1. Business Organization Laws
Applying the principle of national treatment discussed earlier,
foreign investors should be able to conduct operations in Cuba using
the same types of business organization available to Cuban nationals.
This principle has been taken to heart in Central and Eastern
European countries, which allow foreign investors to use all forms of
business organization recognized by local law."8 5  The types of
business organization available to foreign investors in Cuba should be
those recognized by the new Companies Law that Cuba needs to enact
early during its transition to a market economy. Corporate laws should
183 INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 128, at 141.
184 Id. at 141-42. The United States argument that export controls violate the GATT has
been stated as follows:
Export requirements, to the extent that they lead to exports by subsidiaries that
would not have occurred in their absence, have effects similar to export subsidies
which artificially increase the supply of the affected product in the world markets
and displace more efficient home or third country products and exports of the
affected product.
Id. at 142.
185 For example, corporations, limited liability companies, partnerships, etc. Travieso-
Diaz & Escobar on Cuba's Transition, supra note 136, at 415.
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authorize, at a minimum, those forms of business organization with
which foreign investors are most familiar. Cuba could adopt as a
model, for example, the business organizations forms accepted by most
Latin American countries, and in doing so it would reduce transaction
costs for investors interested in doing business in the island.186
2. Privatization Laws
Many foreign investors going into Cuba will want to participate in
the privatization of state-owned enterprises. 87 Privatization is an
extremely complex process, which, in the case of Cuba, will be closely
tied to the program Cuba develops for resolving the outstanding
property expropriations claims1
There are advantages to conveying state-owned enterprises to
foreign investors as part of the privatization process. Foreign investors
bring with them capital resources, management skills, business know-
how, and improved technology, plus the ability to incorporate local
enterprises into the global networks of production and commerce.'89
Allowing foreign investors to participate in the privatization of state-
owned enterprises also enables the country to earn much needed
foreign exchange, 190 an important consideration for what will certain-
ly be a cash-strapped Cuba. Encouraging the participation by foreign
investors, therefore, should be an important goal of the Cuban
privatization program.
Foreign investors are mostly interested in acquiring medium and
large enterprises that are being privatized. 9' The opportunities for
investment in such enterprises, however, may be limited by the
potential restitution of some properties to their former owners-which
might reduce the number of enterprises eligible for privatization.
The Cuban Government could also elect to limit foreign investor
participation in the privatization of certain state-owned assets,
186 The Latin-American forms of business organization are for the most part similar to
those used in the United States and are therefore familiar to U.S. business people. Costa
Rica, for example, allows the formation of limited liability companies by individuals,
unlimited and limited liability companies, partnerships, limited partnerships, and
corporations. Humberto Pacheco A., Costa Rica, in INVERSION EXTRANJERA EN AMERICA
LATINA 63-67 (Jose Luis DePalma ed., 1991).
187 For example, Grupo Domos, a Mexican industrial concern, is already involved in a
venture to acquire a significant share of Cuba's telephone system. CHARLES W. THURSTON,
IN FROM THE COLD: HOW TO Do BUSINESS WITH CUBA 53 (1994). Grupo Domos' deal is said
to potentially involve as much as $1.5 billion in investment, and to be part of a $340 million
debt swap agreement arranged by Mexico's state trade bank. Id. at 53, 54.
188 For a discussion of the issues relating to the resolution of expropriation claims in
Cuba see generally Travieso-Diaz on Claims, supra note 36.
189 FARID DHANJI & BRANKO MILANOviC, PRIVATIZATION IN EASTERN AND CENTRAL
EUROPE: OBJECTIVES, CONSTRAINTS, AND MODELS OF DIVESTITURE 22 (1991).
190 Id.
191 ERNST & YOUNG, PRIVATIZATION: INVESTING IN STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES AROUND
THE WORLD 43 (1994).
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particularly those in "strategic" sectors of the economy. The original
Polish privatization statute, for example, limited the extent of foreign
owned stock in privatized companies to ten percent. 92  However,
since revamping the country's infrastructure is an urgent goal during
the transition period, Cuba should not restrict foreign participation in
privatized enterprises, particularly those in strategic sectors such as
energy production, communications, and transportation.'93
The opportunities for foreign participation in the privatization of
state-owned enterprises may be limited as a practical matter by the
deterioration or obsolescence of the assets of those enterprises.'94
Foreign investors may prefer to invest in new ventures rather than in
dilapidated state-owned enterprises.
Whatever the extent of foreign investor involvement in the
privatization of state-owned assets, the Cuban government should
ensure that investors face as little uncertainty as possible if they choose
to become involved in the privatization process. This means that issues
concerning title to state-owned assets should be settled very early in the
privatization process. In addition, the approval process for the sale of
state-owned assets to foreign investors should be made as simple as
possible. In the early days of privatization in Poland, for example, the
sale of a state-owned enterprise often required approval by the
Workers' Council after consent by a general assembly of workers, and
also by' the Ministry of Ownership Transformation; not surprisingly,
these cumbersome approval requirements discouraged foreign
investors.' Cuba should set up a privatization agency that provides
a "one-stop shopping" point of coordination for the privatization of
public enterprises.' 97 The existence of such an agency would facili-
tate foreign participation in the privatization process.
192 David Gordon, Privatization in Eastern Europe: The Polish Experience, 25 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 517, 543-44 (1994).
193 The current position of the Cuban Government is to exclude "strategic" industries,
such as the electric power industry, from foreign investment activity and presumably from any
privatization initiatives. See Pedro Monreal, Remarks, at SHAW, PiTrMAN, POTTS &
TROWBRIDGE'S WORKSHOP ON THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC REFORMS IN CuBA 85-88 (Apr. 12,
1995), transcript available in Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge's Library, Washington, D.C.
194 Two thirds of Cuba's sugar mills are small and over eighty-five (85) percent were built
before 1913. Confronting the Crisis, supra note 3, at 214. "There are constant grinding
stoppages, and industrial yields have gradually declined: 12.5 percent in 1959-65; 11.4
percent in 1966-80; 11 percent in 1981-85; and 10.8 percent in 1986-89." Id. The just-
completed 1995 sugar harvest of 3.3 million metric tons was the worst in fifty years. Cuban
Closing Out Its Sugar Harvest With Lowest Production in Decades, J. COM., June 12, 1995, at 4B.
195 Jackie Ruff, Job Security in Poland: Economic Privatization Policy and Workplace Protections,
7 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1, 11 (1993).
196 Id. at 12.
197 FACILITATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 108, at 1-3.
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3. Intellectual Property Rights Protection
Cuba's ability to provide effective protection for foreign investor
intellectual property rights will be a crucial factor in the country's
ability to attract many types of foreign investment to the island. 9 8
In addition, Cuba will need effective laws to protect the rights to its
own technological achievements, particularly in biotechnology and
related fields.'99
The Cuban Government should therefore strive to provide legal
protections for intellectual property rights which meet the prevailing
standards in other countries. The United States, in particular, is
aggressive in demanding the protection of intellectual property rights
owned by its enterprises and individuals and often takes action against
foreign governments seen as tolerating the infringement of U.S.-owned
intellectual property rights.00
There is no comprehensive, internationally-recognized set of
standards for the protection of intellectual property rights which could
serve as a model for Cuba.2"' However, the Uruguay Round of the
GATT contains an Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) which contains provisions "for the
establishment of standards to protect a full range of intellectual
property rights, and for the enforcement of those standards both
internally and at the border."20 2 The TRIPS Agreement establishes
minimum standards for the protection of intellectual property for
patents, trademarks, and copyrights, although several important aspects
of intellectual property are not addressed.0 3 Cuban intellectual
property law should at a minimum seek to meet the standards of the
TRIPS Agreement.
The protection of confidential information, trade secrets, and
198 Intellectual property rights in areas of advanced technology include confidential
information, trade secrets, know-how, patents, copyrights, and design rights. See generally
Christopher Millard, Mark Owen & Deborah Ishihara, Intellectual Property Aspects of Technology
Transfers, in INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS 2 (Harry Rubin, ed. & contrib. ed. 1995)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS].
199 CUBA PROSPECTS, supra note 23, at 131. Cuba's VA-MENGOC-BC vaccine, for
example, is reportedly the most effective anti-meningococcal vaccine in the world so far. Id.
at 135.
200 Antonio Mendoza, Promoting the Transfer of US. Technology Across National Borders: The
Enemy Within, 20 N.C.J. INT'L LAw & COM. REG. 97, 99 (1994); see also Tara Kalagher Giunta
& Lily H. Shang, Ownership of Information in a Global Economy, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 327, 335 (1993-94).
201 INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS, supra note 198, at 1-2.
202 Giunta & Shang, supra note 200, at 335-36. See general J.H. Reichman, Universal
Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agree-
ment, 29 INT'L LAw. 345 (1995); Peggy E. Chaundhry and Michael G. Walsh, Intellectual
Property Rights: Changing Levels of Protection Under GATT, NAFTA and the EU, 30 COLUM. J.
WORLD Bus. 80 (Summer 1995).
203 Giunta & Shang, supra note 200, at 336-38.
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know-how against disclosure or misuse by employees is another
important aspect of intellectual property rights protection which is
usually addressed by employment contracts and domestic tort laws.
Cuba's tort laws should include provisions allowing employ-
ers-including foreign investors-to terminate current employees and
sue former ones who divulge confidential information, trade secrets,
or know-how to competitors, irrespective of whether such rights are
included in the employment agreement. In addition, government
sanctions should be established against employees who wrongfully
divulge confidential information, trade secrets, or know-how. The
sanctions could include, for example, withholding unemployment
compensation and other benefits.20 4
4. Tax Laws
A country's attractiveness to foreign investors depends in large
part on its system of taxation. As explained in Part IV.C.2 above,
during its market transition, Cuba may opt to pursue tax reforms that
specifically benefit foreign investors. In any case, Cuba should
implement changes to its tax laws that benefit foreign investors
indirectly by establishing an equitable and predictable system for all
taxpayers. Indeed, experience with tax reform in developing countries
shows that a healthy tax system is a pre-requisite to foreign investment,
irrespective of whether preferential tax treatment is accorded to
foreign investors.
A comparison between the experience of Bolivia in the 1980s with
that of present-day Russia is instructive in this regard. Tax reform in
Bolivia in 1986 succeeded in bringing inflation down from an annual
rate of 12,000 percent to 14 percent in the space of two years.20 5
The reform also sufficiently stabilized the tax environment to reverse
the effects of a fiscal crisis occasioned by a world recession in the early
1980s that had all but cut off the flow of foreign investment.0 6  In
contrast, Russia has created a patchwork quilt of tax laws and imple-
mented piece-meal tax reforms, leading to an overall climate of
regulatory uncertainty that deters foreign investment.0 7
To be supportive of foreign investment, Cuba's tax system should
204 The Costa Rican Labor Code, for example, contains provisions authorizing the
termination of compensation of employees who reveal trade secrets or know-how to their
employer's competitors. CORPORACION INTERAMERICANA DE INVERSIONES, COSTA RICA,
ENTORNO REGLAMENTARIO, INVERSION EXTRANJERA Y PROPIEDAD INTELLECTUAL 57 (1992).
205 Richard M. Bird, Tax Administration and Tax Reform: Reflections on Experience, in TAX
POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIEs 43-44 (Javad Khalilzadeh-Shirazi & Anwar Shah eds., 1991)
[hereinafter TAX POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES].
206 Id.
207 Jeffrey M. Trinklein, Russia Makes Significant Changes to Profits Tax, Amends Excess Wages
Tax and VAT, 8 TAX NOTES INT'L 1039 (1994); see also Hans Jochum Horn, Russia: A Tax
Paradise Lost, 9 TAX NOTES INT'L 331 (1994).
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be simple, uniform, centralized, and well-administered. Good
administration is important: in the early stages of its transition to a
free-market economy Cuba, like many developing countries, will likely
face the problem of poor tax administration, which may effectively
negate the benefits of even the most enlightened tax code."0 8 Likely
lapses in administration should be compensated for by devising a tax
system that features a simple rate structure and few, broad categories
of taxes that apply equally to foreign and domestic businesses. Cuban
tax legislators would be well advised to use tax exemptions and
targeted tax incentives sparingly, 9 and to resist populist pressures
to implement redistributive measures such as steeply progressive
rates."' Close attention should be paid to improving collection
techniques and properly screening personnel in order to minimize the
possibility of corruption by tax collectors and other officials.2 '
It is equally important that the tax system be centralized. During
their market transitions some countries, notably Russia and China,
devolved taxing power from the central authority to the local govern-
ments. 12 Though perhaps ultimately desirable, early tax decentral-
ization has led in those countries to competing tax initiatives by central
and local governments, resulting in an increased overall burden on the
taxpayer.21
In addressing the specific tax concerns of foreign investors,
elimination of double taxation should be a top priority. Most
countries follow the "territorial method" of taxation and levy taxes on
all income earned in the country, whether by a citizen or a foreigner.
Some countries, however, tax their residents on their world-wide
income ("using a residence-based method"), and several countries
combine the two methods.1 4  Double taxation results when an
208 Bird, supra note 205, at 49.
209 As noted earlier, most countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America
have abandoned tax incentives as ineffective in attracting foreign direct investment. See supra
part IV.C.3; Wayne Thirsk, Lessonsfrom Tax Reform: an Overview, in TAX POLICY IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 60 (1990).
210 For a survey of Latin American countries' success in eliminating complex taxes and
redistributive biases see Bird, supra note 205, at 47-48.
211 Charles McLure & George Zodrow, Tax Reform in Colombia: Process and Results, in TAX
POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 18 (Javad Khalilzadeh-Shirazi & Anwar Shah eds., 1990).
Colombian tax reform of 1988 curbed wide-spread corruption among tax administrators, who
had been known to extort bribes by threatening to "lose" tax returns. Under the tax reform,
the collection responsibility was shifted to commercial banks, thus minimizing the direct
contact between taxpayers and tax officials and the resulting potential for abuse. Id.
212 See Roger H. Gordon, Economic Reform in the People's Republic of China, 1979-1988 in
WORLD TAX REFORM 189-90 (1990). See also 1 BUSINESS VENTURES IN EASTERN EUROPE RUSSIA
2-133, 2-134 (David E. Birenbaum ed., 2d ed. 1994).
213 See Gordon, supra note 212, at 190; BUSINESS VENTURES IN EASTERN EUROPE RUSSIA,
supra note 212, at 2-134.
214 Hong Kong, the United States and Germany are examples of the purely territorial
method, the residence-based method, and the mixed method respectively. See Chad Leechor
& Jack Mintz, Taxation of International Income by a Capital-Importing Country: The Perspective of
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investor's home country and the host country follow different methods,
so that the profits generated by the investment are taxed by the host
country under the territorial method, and by the home country under
the residence-based method."5
The two devices most commonly used to alleviate the double-
taxation problem faced by foreign investors are double-taxation treaties
and foreign tax credits. 16 Treaties for the avoidance of double
taxation (i.e., bilateral agreements setting the order of taxation) are
favored by those countries that follow the territorial principle (e.g.,
most countries in Western Europe), while foreign tax credits are used
by those countries that tax their residents on their world-wide income
(e.g., the United States, China and Russia) as a way to offset the
amount of foreign tax already paid. 17 Capital importing countries
such as Cuba should use treaties and foreign tax credit statutes to assist
investors from countries using both systems.218
Finally, Cuba should pursue a tax reform program that emphasizes
consistency and advance planning. No changes should be introduced
without affording those affected advance notice and opportunity for
comment, and grandfathering provisions should be used where
appropriate. There should also be no sudden reversals of those
reforms already in place, a practice in which for example present-day
Russia and Colombia in the 1970s engaged. 19 Together with sensitiv-
ity to the tax pressures faced by foreign investors at home, consistency
and ample advance notice would create a predictable tax environment
that would encourage foreign investment in Cuba.220
B. Other Laws Having Potential Effects on Foreign Investment
In addition to those laws that should be expected to have a
positive effect on foreign investment, there are other laws that are not
directly related to foreign investment, but which may indirectly affect
foreign investment by improving the economic climate or, alternatively,
by imposing requirements that raise costs or make the investment
process more difficult. This section surveys five such types of laws.
Thailand, in TAX POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 103 (Javad Khalilzadeh-Shirazi & Anwar
Shah eds., 1991).
215 Id.
216 Id, see also SWAN & MURPHY, supra note 26, at 715-16.
217 Id. at 104.
218 Id. at 103; see asoJavad Khalilzadeh-Shirazi & Anwar Shah, Introduction and Overview,
in TAX POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES xviii (Javad Khalilzadeh-Shirazi & Anwar Shah eds.,
1991).
219 See Trinklein, supra note 207, at 1044; McLure & Zodrow, supra note 211, at 5.
220 See generallyJavad Khalilzadeh-Shirazi & Anwar Shah, supra note 211.
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1. Economic Restructuring Laws
Economic restructuring legislation will need to be enacted early
in Cuba's transition from a centrally-planned economy to a free-market
one.22 ' Some of that legislation may serve to unleash market forces
and thereby foster foreign investment.
An example of an economic restructuring move that would have
beneficial impact on foreign investment would be de-controlling prices.
Elimination of government controls on prices is one of the basic
requirements for the establishment of a free-market economy, and one
that has been accomplished in most countries making the transition
from socialism in Central and Eastern Europe.
222
A detailed discussion of economic restructuring laws is outside the
scope of this article. However, such laws provide an essential backdrop
to any efforts to foster foreign investment in Cuba during its free-
market transition.
2. Worker Benefits and Foreign Labor Restrictions
Labor laws and regulations, 223 and the costs they impose on
employers, are an important factor in the investment climate. 4 In
enacting new labor laws and regulations, the Cuban Government must
make a trade-off between providing worker benefits and social safety
nets to promote social stability, and cutting operational costs to
employers so as to promote foreign investment. 225  It seems likely
that the extensive social safety net now in place in Cuba will be
preserved to some extent during the country's transition to a market
economy.2 26 This prospect is reinforced by the experience of most
Central and Eastern European countries, which have chosen, or been
forced, to preserve their well-developed but costly social safety nets.227
If Cuba retains a significant social safety net it should take steps to
clearly define foreign employer liabilities and responsibilities towards
221 Travieso-Diaz & Escobar on Cuba's Transition, supra note 136, at 410-11, 418-19.
222 Economists tend to agree that price liberalization must be introduced immediately
once Cuba starts its transition to a free-market economy. Gradual price liberalization is
regarded as counterproductive, since it could lead to spiraling prices and shortages of goods.
See, e.g., Ernesto H. Hernandez-Cata, Long Term Objectives and Transitional Policies-A Reflection
on Pazos' "Economic Problems of Cuba," in CUBA IN TRANSITION-PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF
THE FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY,
Miami, Fla., 36, 46-50 (Aug. 1991).
223 Employee-employer relations, minimum wage provisions, and other standard labor
law topics are outside the scope of this paper.
224 LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 9, at 25.
225 Id.
226 Travieso-Diaz & Escobar on Cuba's Transition, supra note 136, at 409-10.
227 Id.
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the labor force and avoid unwritten or poorly defined require-
ments. 2 ' These steps should include provisions requiring communi-
cating to foreign investors all social safety net laws to which they may
be subject. The Cuban Government may also come under pressure to
impose restrictions on the ability of private enterprises to hire foreign
employees. Such restrictions could include the need to obtain work
permits and the placement of limits on the number of foreign
employees allowed at an enterprise. 29  Restrictions on foreign
employees, such as work permits, are in use in many countries.30
In developing the transition period labor laws, provisions which
require local labor participation (e.g., mandating the hiring of local
management personnel) should give way to allowing investors freedom
in their employment decisions because provisions regulating foreign
investor hiring practices will probably deter some kinds of investment,
particularly those calling for workers with skills in short supply.
3. Immigration Laws and Restrictions
As Cuba's transition progresses and the country's political and
economic situation settles, foreign investors will probably seek to visit
the island in increasing numbers.23' The Cuban Government should
take steps to facilitate temporary visits and the long-term or permanent
migration of foreign investors.
One important issue which needs to be resolved in developing an
immigration regime for foreign investors is the treatment of Cuban
expatriates who wish to invest in Cuba. Should they be considered
"foreign" investors and be eligible for any special benefits given to such
investors?232  On the one hand, the definition of a foreign citizen
should be as broad and inclusive as possible to maximize the inflow of
228 In Guatemala, for example, employees may accrue benefits which the employer
provides without legal or contractual obligation. For example, if an employer establishes a
tradition of paying a bonus in addition to a statutory required bonus, such as the Christmas
bonus, such a bonus could become an "acquired right." The employee could sue to collect
an acquired right bonus if, for example, the enterprise's earnings were down and' the
employer did not pay the bonus. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, FOREIGN LABOR TRENDS:
GUATEMALA 10 (1990).
229 Costa Rica, for example, requires that 90% of the total employees in a given
enterprise be Costa Rican nationals, although two managers are exempt from this quota.
The Costa Rican government also requires work permits for foreign employees. Robert
Harlan Stempler, Costa Rica: A Nirvana for Export Manufacturers? 4 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 201, 205
(1991).
230 Most economists recognize that there are both positive and negative consequences
to controlling immigration into a country. In the U.S. the issue has been fiercely debated
since the nineteenth century. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 181
(David L. Shapiro et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION LAW].
231 See Opening the Door for Business Travel to a Free-Market Cuba, 1 FREE MARKET CUBA Bus.
J. 7 (Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, Spring/Summer 1992) [hereinafter Opening the
Door].
232 Travieso-Diaz & Escobar on Cuba's Transition, supra note 136, at 414-15.
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foreign-based capital.2 3 On the other hand, granting Cuban expatri-
ates privileges unavailable to resident nationals could lead to resent-
ment from people on the island. This is an extremely sensitive
political issue that is part of the broader question of the citizenship
status and rights of those Cuban nationals who have moved abroad and
acquired foreign citizenship.
234
One component of the foreign investor immigration treatment is
the visa structure for business travelers. A business visa structure
during Cuba's market transition will likely follow one of four patterns:
a) No visa requirement for short-term business trips (A visa would be
required only if the trip was to extend beyond the designated
period-several countries, such as Chile and the Czech Republic,
have implemented this type of visa structure);
b) No visa requirements for business travel, unless the foreign
national will be employed during the trip (several Western
European countries have a visa structure along these lines);
c) A visa structure similar to that of the United States, under which
there would be several categories of business visas corresponding
to the nature of employment performed in the host country and
the duration of the stay; and
d) A requirement that all business visitors obtain a visa, with different
eligibility criteria depending on the purposes and intended length
of stay.23
5
In developing its business visa structure, the Cuban Government
should keep in mind several important considerations regarding
foreign investors. First, and probably most importantly, foreign
investors should have the ability to employ foreign personnel,
particularly for key positions. 36  The Cuban government should
therefore refrain from unduly limiting the number of foreign
personnel a company can bring into the country, or imposing
unreasonable time limits on their visas. As noted earlier, there will be
an acute shortage of skilled management personnel in Cuba during
the transition to a market economy, so a large number of foreign
managers will be necessary to operate foreign investors' enterprises
until the local population acquires the requisite management and
business skills.
Second, the Cuban business visitor visa structure should not
233 Under Cuba's constitutions, both pre- and post-revolution, a Cuban citizen who
becomes a citizen of another country loses his Cuban citizenship. CONSTITUCION DE LA
REPUBLICA DE CUBA, art. 15 (CUBA 1940), reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 612
(AmosJ. Peaslee ed. & trans., 2d ed.) (hereinafter CONSTITUTION]; CONSTrruGION DE 1992,
supra note 22, art. 32. Thus, unless the laws are changed, Cuban expatriates will need to be
classified as foreign investors.
234 Id.
235 Opening the Door, supra note 231, at 8.
236 See LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 9, at 159.
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establish special visa categories for particular classes of foreign
investors. An example of this type of visa is the "alien entrepreneur"
visa program in the United States, which reserves a certain number of
immigrant visas for investors "who establish new commercial enterpris-
es in the United States, invest at least $1,000,000 ... and employ at
least ten Americans. 237 This type of special incentive is warranted
only if a restrictive business visa structure is in place, which should not
be the case in Cuba during the transition to a market economy. Both
large and small investors should be allowed easy access to the island.
Finally, the business visa structure during the transition period
should be kept simple. This approach would reduce time and
transaction costs for foreign investors, and thus encourage foreign
investment. In addition, a simple business visa structure would reduce
the cost and complexity of administering the program, another
important consideration given Cuba's lack of resources.
4. Environmental Laws
During the early phase of its transition to a market economy, Cuba
may refrain from imposing major new environmental requirements or
assessing liabilities for past environmental damage.3 Significant
environmental legislation may not be put in place until several years
after the transition to a market economy, when the economy has
stabilized and recovery is on its way.239 Given the extent to which
environmental degradation has already occurred in Cuba, however, the
enactment of wide-ranging environmental legislation is likely to be
inevitable. In addition, Cuba's growing tourism industry will require
a high level of environmental quality control (i.e. clean beaches,
unpolluted coastal waters, etc.) and, consequently, increased environ-
mental regulation.
The need to comply with Cuba's environmental laws will be a
factor that sophisticated foreign investors will include in their
investment decisions. 40  Pre-investment planning often includes
examining existing and imminent environmental laws to find ways of
structuring the investment so that compliance with the laws is achieved
while minimizing its impact on the cost of the projects.2 4' Adequate
237 IMMIGRATION LAW, supra note 230, at 196; IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALIY ACT
§ 203(b) (5), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (5) (1990).
238 Travieso-Diaz & Escobar on Cuba's Transition, supra note 136, at 421.
239 Id. at 422.
240 Anecdotal evidence suggests that businesses increasingly factor environmental issues
into their foreign investment decisions. See, e.g. Norman E. Gelber, Apparel Dominates
Caribbean Conference, BOBBIN, Feb. 1993, at 76 (comment by a Levi Strauss & Company's
executive).
241 Frederick R. Anderson, Environmental Aspects to Foreign Investment in Latin America, in
INVESTMENT AND TRADE IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE, MEXICO AND VENEZUELA (1992), at 151,
154-55 (PLI Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 643, 1992).
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environmental compliance plans help prevent environmental disasters,
allow proposed projects to proceed successfully through the pre-
approval review process, and in case of a legal challenge, help convince
the decisionmaker that the project meets environmental standards.142
Additional environmental compliance issues will be faced by
foreign investors who become involved in the privatization of state
enterprises. The main questions in those cases will have to do with the
extent to which an investor acquiring a state enterprise will assume
liability for environmental damage or hazards created by the enterprise
while in the hands of the state. 43 In Czechoslovakia, for example,
uncertainty over responsibility for environmental liabilities incurred in
the past by state enterprises raised concerns with foreign investors that
participated in the country's privatization program.2" The Czech
government has tried to deal with this issue by promising investors
limited indemnification for environmental liabilities which have not
been identified at the time a venture is negotiated. 45 Cuba will need
to develop clear rules for determining the extent to which investors
acquiring privatized enterprises are subject to liability for past
environmental damage.
5. Alternative Dispute Resolution
The existence of effective dispute resolution mechanisms is an
important factor in a foreign investment decision since the expectation
of prompt and fair resolution of disputes bears on the safety of an
investment. An effective judicial system in Cuba would go a long way
towards assuring an investor that his/her investment is secure.
However, the Cuban judicial system will probably be overloaded and
have little experience in adjudicating international business disputes
during the country's transition to a market economy. Thus, foreign
investors will likely favor contractually-agreed arbitration to resolve
disputes that arise from doing business in Cuba.2 46
Arbitration is increasingly used to settle international investment
disputes.2 47  In the Western Hemisphere, three treaties establish
substantive law and procedures for international arbitration: 1) the
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards (U.N. Convention); 2) the Inter-American
242 Id. at 152. The impact of growing environmental consciousness in the Caribbean
Basin cannot be understated. Exxon, for example, scrapped an oil drilling project in the
northern jungle of Guatemala due to criticism by environmental groups. Exxon had sunk
approximately $21 million into the project. Chris Brogan, Overtures Made to Oil Explorers, 59
PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, June 7, 1992.
243 EVOLVING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS, supra note 103, at 55.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Travieso-Diaz & Escobar on Cuba's Transition, supra note 136, at 400-01.
247 SWAN & MURPHY, supra note 26, at 958.
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Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (Inter-American
Convention); and 3) the ICSID Convention.248 The Inter-American
Convention "essentially replicates the ... [U. N. Convention], with the
major difference [being] that the Inter-American Convention provides
for a mechanism to administer international commercial arbitrations
in the [Western] Hemisphere and, in addition, provides for rules of
procedure." 249 The ICSID Convention, as mentioned earlier, only
applies to disputes between investors and the host state.25°
Cuba's accession to the various international arbitration conven-
tions (which are not mutually exclusive) would set up a viable dispute
resolution mechanism to handle foreign investor claims during Cuba's
transition to a market economy. This mechanism would be particularly
well-suited to the transition period, given that the Cuban judiciary
system will then be ill-equipped to deal with foreign investor disputes.
VI. Conclusion
Cuba has recently introduced a number of economic reforms and
is likely to implement additional measures to create a favorable
environment for foreign investment. Cuba has also sought to make
attractive opportunities available to foreign investors, and has
succeeded in bringing investments to certain areas of its economy,
notably tourism. A new foreign investment code, providing for limited
liberalization of the investment rules, has just been enacted.
Despite these advances, foreign investment in Cuba remains a
difficult, high risk proposition. Unless and until there is a significant
relaxation of the government controls and investment restrictions that
are now in place, it is unlikely that there will be a sufficient influx of
foreign investment to turn the economy around. Accordingly, Cuba's
political leaders during the transition should place a high priority on
creating a foreign investment structure-in the form of a modern
Foreign Investment Code, related laws, and appropriate administrative
mechanisms-that make the decision of a prospective foreign investor
to go into Cuba easy to reach and just as simple to carry out.
248 Charles Robert Norberg, Symposium: Current Issues in International Commercial
Arbitration: Recent Developments in Inter-American Commercial Arbitration, 12J. INT'L. L. Bus. 86
(Spring/Summer 1991). The U.N. Convention has been ratified by sixteen Western
Hemisphere countries (including Cuba), the Inter-American Convention by thirteen, and the
ICSID Convention by ten. Id. at 89.
249 Id. at 89.
250 BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 339 (1991).
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